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Multi-Dimensional Matching

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  • Irene Aldridge

Abstract

We study a matching mechanism where agents and objects are described by features rather than complete rankings. A single spectral projection reduces the problem to a one-dimensional sort, computable in O(N log N) time. We prove that on descaled features and preferences, our algorithm obtains the exact Nash Social Welfare (NSW) optimum within the projected space, with an unconditional utilitarian-welfare guarantee and a conditional NSW guarantee. The proposed mechanism is stable against exogenous noise but not strategy-proof; we provide an explicit profitable misreport. On an agentic AI shopping application, the diagnostics correctly anticipate both a success and a failure case. A 100-instance robustness study confirms the findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Irene Aldridge, 2026. "Multi-Dimensional Matching," Papers 2609.29958, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2609.29958
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    References listed on IDEAS

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