Report NEP-DES-2026-10-05

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.

Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Jason Hartline, 2026, "Robustness in Mechanism Design," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2610.01805, Oct, revised Oct 2026.
• Minoru Kitahara & Yasunori Okumura, 2026, "Stable Improvement Cycle Mechanism Versus Efficiency-adjusted Deferred Acceptance Mechanism beyond Weak Priority Orders," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.12543, Sep.
• Lars Ehlers & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2026, "Priority Blockers: Welfare and Incentives in Matching under General Constraints," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.25481, Sep.
• Masato Eguchi, 2026, "The Limits of Rank-Dependent Priorities in School Choice," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.39425, Sep.
• Minoru Kitahara & Yasunori Okumura, 2026, "School Choice Problems with Priority Adjustments," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.12558, Sep.
• Szilvia P'apai, 2026, "Singleton-Attainability and Transparent Access in Matching," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.27293, Sep.
• Benjamin Brooks & Songzi Du, 2026, "Participation Security and Elementary Mechanisms," Working Papers, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics, number 2026-126, Sep.
• Ozgun Ekici & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2026, "Pair rationality and top trading cycles on single-peaked and single-dipped domains," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.39163, Sep.
• Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira, 2026, "Credible AUctions via MPC Gadgets: Bounding Information Leakage Under Abort," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.27402, Sep.
• Thanawat Sornwanee, 2026, "Very Credible Auction," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.14263, Sep.
• Teemu Pennanen, 2026, "Social welfare and price discovery in double auction markets," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2610.01562, Oct, revised Oct 2026.
• Shota Ichihashi & Doh-Shin Jeon & Byung-Cheol Kim, 2026, "Mechanism Design for Ad-Supported Platforms," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.12870, Sep.
• Arkarup Basu Mallik & Mihir Bhattacharya & Ojasvi Khare, 2026, "Strategy-Proof Set-Valued Choice on Single-Dipped Domains," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.14059, Sep.
• Xiaotie Deng & Ningyuan Li, 2026, "Strategic Disclosure of Action Space in Principal-Agent Contracts," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.25410, Sep, revised Sep 2026.
• Ozgun Ekici & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2026, "Minimally rational reallocation of objects," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.28174, Sep.
• Yasushi Kawase & Warut Suksompong & Hanna Sumita & Yu Yokoi, 2026, "Fractional Assignment with $\ell_1$ Preferences," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.18299, Sep.
• Siwei Chen & Pengbo Wang, 2026, "Strategy-proof choice on strictly convex frontiers," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.26302, Sep.
• Simon van Tartwijk, 2026, "Randomizing in Search Ad Auctions to Extract Revenue from Runaway Winners," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 26-075/VII, Sep.
• Terrence McGovern & Jan Benedikt Napp & Wenjun Zheng, 2026, "Prior-Free Delegation," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.31529, Sep.
• Hiroto Sato & Ryo Shirakawa, 2026, "Feasible Search Behavior," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.16431, Sep.
• Hiroto Sawada & Raphael Boleslavsky & Kristopher W. Ramsay & Mehdi Shadmehr, 2026, "Designing Signals for Deterrence," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.14625, Sep.
• Tingyi Lin & Yichen Shi & Ke Dong & Jiazhuo Li & Shawn Yu & Huanxi Zhang, 2026, "The Exact Welfare Guarantee of Fixed-Price Bilateral Trade," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.35888, Sep, revised Sep 2026.
• Han Wang, 2026, "Contracting for Information: Heterogeneous Costs and Investment Opportunities," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.15019, Sep, revised Sep 2026.
• Ian Ball & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2026, "The Robustness of Sequential Implementation under Information Perturbations," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.30464, Sep, revised Oct 2026.
• Irene Aldridge, 2026, "Multi-Dimensional Matching," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.29958, Sep.
• Emmanuel Guerre & Yao Luo, 2026, "Nonparametric Identification of First-Price Auction with Unobserved Competition: A Density Discontinuity Framework," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-827, Sep.
• Zi Yang Kang & Piotr Dworczak, 2026, "Pareto-Improving Pricing: Why 3 Is Better Than 2," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.22652, Sep.
• Rod Falvey & Tom Lane & Shravan Luckraz & Shuo Yang & Wanjun Zheng, 2026, "Enforcing Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Team Production: Theory and Experiments," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham, number 2026-05, May.
• Yijia Ding, 2026, "An Explicit Solution for the Two-Bidder All-Pay Auction with Arbitrary Type Distributions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2609.14041, Sep.
• Georgy Lukyanov & Yaroslav Yosifov, 2026, "Defense Feedback and Global-Game Selection," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2610.00323, Sep.

Report NEP-DES-2026-10-05

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.

Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report: