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Very Credible Auction

Author

Listed:
  • Thanawat Sornwanee

Abstract

We introduce a notion and motivation for very credible auctions. This is a strengthening in the commitment in the credible auctions setting, making it more suitable for a modern digital applications.

Suggested Citation

  • Thanawat Sornwanee, 2026. "Very Credible Auction," Papers 2609.14263, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2609.14263
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    File URL: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2609.14263
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thanawat Sornwanee, 2025. "1-Dimensional Normal Competitive Market Equilibrium," Papers 2505.08425, arXiv.org.
    2. Mohammad Akbarpour & Shengwu Li, 2020. "Credible Auctions: A Trilemma," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 425-467, March.
    3. Ostrovsky, Michael & Skrzypacz, Andy, 2022. "Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction," Research Papers 4043, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    4. Shengwu Li, 2017. "Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(11), pages 3257-3287, November.
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