IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2608.14017.html

An axiomatic model of robust Bayesian persuasion

Author

Listed:
  • Wataru Kitano
  • Shohei Yanagita

Abstract

We develop an axiomatic model of robust Bayesian persuasion where the sender cannot fully control the information available to the receiver. After selecting an information structure, the sender expects that more informative structures might be implemented. We model this by allowing the sender to assess each information structure under worst-case information leakage, represented by a set of more informative structures. The model encompasses a wide range of examples of information leakage, which we also explore.

Suggested Citation

  • Wataru Kitano & Shohei Yanagita, 2026. "An axiomatic model of robust Bayesian persuasion," Papers 2608.14017, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2608.14017
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2608.14017
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kreps, David M, 1979. "A Representation Theorem for "Preference for Flexibility"," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 565-577, May.
    2. Daron Acemoglu & Asuman Ozdaglar & James Siderius, 2024. "A Model of Online Misinformation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(6), pages 3117-3150.
    3. Alexander M. Jakobsen, 2021. "An Axiomatic Model of Persuasion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(5), pages 2081-2116, September.
    4. Jean-Pierre Dubé & John G. Lynch & Dirk Bergemann & Mert Demirer & Avi Goldfarb & Garrett Johnson & Anja Lambrecht & Tesary Lin & Anna Tuchman & Catherine Tucker, 2025. "Frontiers: The Intended and Unintended Consequences of Privacy Regulation for Consumer Marketing," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(5), pages 975-984, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thunström, Linda & Nordström, Jonas & Shogren, Jason F., 2015. "Certainty and overconfidence in future preferences for food," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 101-113.
    2. Christopher P. Chambers & Federico Echenique & Eran Shmaya, 2014. "The Axiomatic Structure of Empirical Content," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(8), pages 2303-2319, August.
    3. Evan Piermont, 2021. "Hypothetical Expected Utility," Papers 2106.15979, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
    4. André Lapied & Thomas Rongiconi, 2013. "Ambiguity as a Source of Temptation: Modeling Unstable Beliefs," Working Papers halshs-00797631, HAL.
    5. Vassili Vergopoulos, 2014. "A Behavioral Definition of States of the World," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14047, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    6. Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman & Aldo Rustichini, 2009. "Temptation-Driven Preferences," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(3), pages 937-971.
    7. Andreoni, James & Serra-Garcia, Marta, 2021. "Time inconsistent charitable giving," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    8. Takashi Hayashi & Noriaki Kiguchi & Norio Takeoka, 2024. "Temptation and self‐control for the impure benevolent planner: The case of heterogeneous discounting," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(1), February.
    9. Germano, Fabrizio & Gómez, Vicenç & Sobbrio, Francesco, 2026. "Ranking for engagement: How social media algorithms fuel misinformation and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 255(C).
    10. Youichiro Higashi & Kazuya Hyogo, 2012. "Lexicographic expected utility with a subjective state space," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(1), pages 175-192, January.
    11. Laureti, Carolina & Szafarz, Ariane, 2023. "Banking regulation and costless commitment contracts for time-inconsistent agents," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    12. Barbera, S. & Bossert, W. & Pattanaik, P.K., 2001. "Ranking Sets of Objects," Cahiers de recherche 2001-02, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    13. Lefgren, Lars J. & Stoddard, Olga B. & Stovall, John E., 2021. "Rationalizing self-defeating behaviors: Theory and evidence," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    14. Pivato, Marcus, 2010. "Risky social choice with approximate interpersonal comparisons of well-being," MPRA Paper 25222, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Riella, Gil, 2013. "Preference for Flexibility and Dynamic Consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2467-2482.
    16. Yeganeh Alimohammadi & Karissa Huang & Christian Borgs & Jennifer Chayes, 2026. "Auditing the Auditors: Does Community-based Moderation Get It Right?," Papers 2603.18053, arXiv.org, revised May 2026.
    17. James J. Heckman & Stefano Mosso, 2014. "The Economics of Human Development and Social Mobility," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 689-733, August.
    18. Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler, 2012. "Fact-Free Learning," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Case-Based Predictions An Axiomatic Approach to Prediction, Classification and Statistical Learning, chapter 8, pages 185-210, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    19. Gharad Bryan & Dean Karlan & Scott Nelson, 2009. "Commitment Contracts," Working Papers 980, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    20. Joseph E Stiglitz & Martin M Guzman, 2021. "The pandemic economic crisis, precautionary behavior, and mobility constraints: an application of the dynamic disequilibrium model with randomness† [A new view of technological change]," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 30(2), pages 467-497.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2608.14017. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.