IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2607.28821.html

Local Global Games and Network Common Learning

Author

Listed:
  • Olga Rospuskova
  • Omer Tamuz
  • Jake Zhang

Abstract

We study global games in which agents coordinate locally, with their social network neighbors, contingent on a favorable state. Before acting, agents learn the private signals of all agents within network distance $r$. As $r$ grows, every agent learns the state, but efficient coordination depends on higher-order beliefs, which are shaped by the geometry of the network. We introduce network common learning, a network analogue of common learning, and show that it is attained when neighboring agents' observations differ by many signals, as on the two-dimensional grid, but fails on networks with informational bottlenecks, such as the line, where only the safe action survives in equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Olga Rospuskova & Omer Tamuz & Jake Zhang, 2026. "Local Global Games and Network Common Learning," Papers 2607.28821, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2607.28821
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.28821
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tom Hutchcroft & Olga Rospuskova & Omer Tamuz, 2026. "Local Coordination and the Geometry of Social Networks," Papers 2602.12571, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2026.
    2. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-1071, September.
    3. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-391, June.
    4. Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 2000. "Communication and Coordination in Social Networks," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 1-16.
    5. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
    6. Martin Cripps & Jeffrey Ely & George Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2013. "Common learning with intertemporal dependence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 55-98, February.
    7. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(3), pages 711-756, May.
    8. Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2023. "Learning Efficiency of Multiagent Information Structures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(12), pages 3377-3414.
    9. Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru, 2015. "Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: The bilingual game and general supermodular games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 100-127.
    10. Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2011. "Communication, timing, and common learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 230-247, January.
    11. Kets, Willemien, 2011. "Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 300-325, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. John Higgins & Tarun Sabarwal, 2023. "Control and spread of contagion in networks with global effects," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(6), pages 1149-1187, December.
    2. Dominik Grafenhofer & Wolfgang Kuhle, 2021. "Observing Actions in Global Games," Papers 2111.10554, arXiv.org.
    3. John Higgins & Tarun Sabarwal, 2021. "Control and Spread of Contagion in Networks," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 202111, University of Kansas, Department of Economics.
    4. Dominik Grafenhofer & Wolfgang Kuhle, 2019. "Observing Actions in Bayesian Games," Papers 1904.10744, arXiv.org.
    5. Wolfgang Kuhle, 2024. "Games with Planned Actions and Scouting," Papers 2408.09778, arXiv.org.
    6. Li, Fei & Song, Yangbo & Zhao, Mofei, 2023. "Global manipulation by local obfuscation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    7. Yi, Ming, 2017. "Speculator-triggered crisis and interventions," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 135-146.
    8. Basu, Pathikrit & Chatterjee, Kalyan & Hoshino, Tetsuya & Tamuz, Omer, 2020. "Repeated coordination with private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    9. Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2021. "Learning Efficiency of Multi-Agent Information Structures," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2299R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Dec 2021.
    10. Grafenhofer, Dominik & Kuhle, Wolfgang, 2016. "Observing each other’s observations in a Bayesian coordination game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 10-17.
    11. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2015. "A model of belief influence in large social networks," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 21-59, May.
    12. Wolfgang Kuhle, 2026. "Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games with Planned Actions and Scouting," Papers 2609.17608, arXiv.org.
    13. Dominik Grafenhofer & Wolfgang Kuhle, 2022. "Observing actions in global games," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 2(12), pages 1-15, December.
    14. Łukasz Balbus & Michael Greinecker & Kevin Reffett & Łukasz Woźny, 2025. "Interim Correlated Rationalizability in Large Games," KAE Working Papers 2025-113, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis.
    15. Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru, 2011. "On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 683-688.
    16. Angeletos, G.-M. & Lian, C., 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1065-1240, Elsevier.
    17. Morris, Stephen, 2014. "Coordination, timing and common knowledge," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(4), pages 306-314.
    18. Hubert Janos Kiss & Ismael Rodríguez-Lara & Alfonso Rosa-García, 2017. "Overthrowing the dictator: a game-theoretic approach to revolutions and media," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(2), pages 329-355, August.
    19. Goyal, Sanjeev & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2005. "Network formation and social coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 178-207, February.
    20. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 2020. "Notes on “refinements and higher order beliefs”," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 35-41, January.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2607.28821. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.