From Centrality Discounts to Centrality Premia: Interoperability and Platform Competition in Social Networks

We study how interoperability reshapes competitive price discrimination when consumers are embedded in a social network. Two differentiated platforms set personalized prices; consumers benefit from neighbors' consumption of the same platform and, under interoperability, of the rival. Equilibrium prices obtain in closed form for arbitrary networks and contain a network-position term, proportional to Katz-Bonacich centrality, whose sign is determined by whether interoperability exceeds product substitutability. Below this threshold, platforms contest central consumers and grant centrality discounts; above it, central consumers become gateways to a shared cross-platform network and pay premia; at the threshold, prices are independent of network position. Interoperability softens price competition, can make platforms favor denser consumer networks, and reverses which side of the market gains from price discrimination.