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The Impossibility of a Gerrymander-Proof Representative Democracy

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  • John Mori

Abstract

A representative democracy is immune to gerrymandering if it satisfies Chambers' (2008) representative consistency. We examine preference aggregation and show that representative consistency is mutually inconsistent with three other normative desiderata -- efficiency, anonymity, and neutrality. We show this impossibility result both in a setting with ordinal preferences and a setting with expected utility preferences.

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  • John Mori, 2026. "The Impossibility of a Gerrymander-Proof Representative Democracy," Papers 2607.05660, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2607.05660
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    7. Uzi Segal, 2000. "Let's Agree That All Dictatorships Are Equally Bad," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(3), pages 569-589, June.
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