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The Winner's Bliss in Common-Value Auctions under Horizontal Differentiation

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  • Jiawei Chen
  • Anh Nguyen
  • Matthew Shum

Abstract

We study common-value auctions in which bidders have horizontally differentiated preferences. In a specific two-bidder parameterization, winning conveys good news about the object's value to the winner, a phenomenon we call the winner's bliss in contrast to the conventional winner's curse. Additional implications also differ from the conventional analysis. When bidders' preferences are horizontally differentiated, seller revenue is reduced with information disclosure, and advantageous selection sustains bilateral trade under asymmetric information.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiawei Chen & Anh Nguyen & Matthew Shum, 2026. "The Winner's Bliss in Common-Value Auctions under Horizontal Differentiation," Papers 2606.08419, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2606.08419
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.08419
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