Matching auction with winner’s curse and imperfect financial markets
This paper explains how and why the Matching Auctions work better with Imperfect Financial Markets. We show that an efficient outsider can obtain a “good” project even if the insider has informational advantage.
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- Holt, Charles A & Sherman, Roger, 1994. "The Loser's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 642-52, June.
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- Paul Klemperer, 1997. "Auctions with Almost Common Values: The Wallet Game and its Applications," Economics Series Working Papers 1998-W03, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Gary Charness & Dan Levin, 2005.
"The Origin of the Winner’s Curse: A Laboratory Study,"
666156000000000602, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Gary Charness & Dan Levin, 2009. "The Origin of the Winner's Curse: A Laboratory Study," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 207-36, February.
- Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984.
"Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers,"
Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
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