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Measuring Concentration of Power in Approval Voting Games

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  • Takaaki Abe

Abstract

The ratio of voting power between a permanent member and a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council varies substantially across indices: approximately 100 to 1 according to the Shapley-Shubik index, 10 to 1 according to the Banzhaf index, and 2.5 to 1 according to the Deegan-Packel index. Such comparisons depend on the choice of power index and are meaningful only in settings where players are divided into two types. To address these limitations, this paper proposes and characterizes a function that measures the level of power concentration in monotonic approval voting games. The proposed measure assigns a single value to each voting game, reflecting the extent to which voting power is unevenly distributed among players. The proposed measure is proportional to the sum of squared Deegan-Packel power indices and can also be interpreted as the degree of overlap among minimal winning coalitions. An application to the United Nations Security Council is also provided.

Suggested Citation

  • Takaaki Abe, 2026. "Measuring Concentration of Power in Approval Voting Games," Papers 2606.05655, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2026.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2606.05655
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