IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v167y2018icp48-50.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Balanced contributions based on indirect claims and the Shapley value

Author

Listed:
  • Kongo, Takumi

Abstract

We provide a new axiom that is weaker than the balanced contributions property but stronger than the balanced cycle contributions property. It axiomatizes the Shapley value, together with efficiency and a weaker variation of the null player out property.

Suggested Citation

  • Kongo, Takumi, 2018. "Balanced contributions based on indirect claims and the Shapley value," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 48-50.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:167:y:2018:i:c:p:48-50
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.008
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176518300995
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.008?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean J. M. Derks & Hans H. Haller, 1999. "Null Players Out? Linear Values For Games With Variable Supports," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 1(03n04), pages 301-314.
    2. Béal, Sylvain & Ferrières, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2016. "Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 47-57.
    3. Yoshio Kamijo & Takumi Kongo, 2010. "Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(4), pages 563-571, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Casajus, André, 2021. "Weakly balanced contributions and the weighted Shapley values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    2. Kjell Hausken, 2020. "The Shapley value of coalitions to other coalitions," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 7(1), pages 1-10, December.
    3. Casajus, André, 2018. "Symmetry, mutual dependence, and the weighted Shapley values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 105-123.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2015. "Preserving or removing special players: What keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 23-31.
    2. Sylvain Ferrières, 2017. "Nullified equal loss property and equal division values," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(3), pages 385-406, October.
    3. Koji Yokote, 2015. "Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(2), pages 275-293, May.
    4. Yokote, Koji & Kongo, Takumi & Funaki, Yukihiko, 2018. "The balanced contributions property for equal contributors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 113-124.
    5. Casajus, André & Huettner, Frank, 2014. "On a class of solidarity values," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 236(2), pages 583-591.
    6. Béal, Sylvain & Ferrières, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2018. "The proportional Shapley value and applications," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 93-112.
    7. Béal, Sylvain & Ferrières, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2016. "Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 47-57.
    8. Koji Yokote & Takumi Kongo & Yukihiko Funaki, 2019. "Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(2), pages 197-212, August.
    9. Sylvain Ferrières, 2016. "Smoothness, nullified equal loss property and equal division values," Working Papers 2016-01, CRESE.
    10. Kamijo, Yoshio & Kongo, Takumi, 2012. "Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 216(3), pages 638-646.
    11. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2018. "Membership separability: A new axiomatization of the Shapley value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 125-129.
    12. Besner, Manfred, 2022. "Impacts of boycotts concerning the Shapley value and extensions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    13. Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Catherine Refait-Alexandre & Guillaume Sekli, 2022. "Early contributors, cooperation and fair rewards in crowdfunding," Working Papers hal-04222321, HAL.
    14. Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Rodrigue Tido Takeng, 2024. "Cooperative games with diversity constraints," Working Papers hal-04447373, HAL.
    15. Youngsub Chun & Boram Park, 2016. "The airport problem with capacity constraints," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(3), pages 237-253, September.
    16. Ghintran, Amandine, 2013. "Weighted position values," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 157-163.
    17. René Brink & Yukihiko Funaki, 2009. "Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for TU-Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 303-340, September.
    18. Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Philippe Solal, 2022. "The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(2), pages 431-450, June.
    19. Harald Wiese, 2012. "Values with exogenous payments," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(4), pages 485-508, April.
    20. Manfred Besner, 2022. "Harsanyi support levels solutions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(1), pages 105-130, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Axiomatization; Balanced contribution; Null player out; Shapley value;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:167:y:2018:i:c:p:48-50. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.