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Partition function form games with probabilistic beliefs

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  • Paraskevas V. Lekeas
  • Giorgos Stamatopoulos

Abstract

We revisit games in partition function form, i.e. cooperative games where the payoff of a coalition depends on the partition of the entire set of players. We assume that each coalition computes its worth having probabilistic beliefs over the coalitional behavior of the outsiders, i.e., it assigns various probability distributions over the set of partitions that the outsiders can form. These beliefs are not necessarily consistent with respect to the actual choices of the outsiders. We apply this framework to symmetric partition function form games characterized by either positive or negative externalities and we derive conditions on coalitional beliefs that guarantee the non-emptiness of the core of the induced games.

Suggested Citation

  • Paraskevas V. Lekeas & Giorgos Stamatopoulos, 2026. "Partition function form games with probabilistic beliefs," Papers 2605.01521, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2605.01521
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    References listed on IDEAS

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