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The geometric adjudication of water rights in international rivers

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  • Ricardo Martinez
  • Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

Abstract

We study the adjudication of water rights in international rivers. We characterize allocation rules that formalize focal principles to deal with water disputes in a basic model. Central to our analysis is a family of geometric rules that implement concatenated transfers downstream. They can be seen as formalizing Limited Territorial Sovereignty, as suggested in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. We apply our rules to the case of the Nile River, with a long history of disputes between downstream and upstream nations

Suggested Citation

  • Ricardo Martinez & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2026. "The geometric adjudication of water rights in international rivers," Papers 2601.04150, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2601.04150
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Gudmundsson, Jens & Hougaard, Jens Leth & Ko, Chiu Yu, 2019. "Decentralized mechanisms for river sharing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 67-81.
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    6. Scott Jasechko & Hansjörg Seybold & Debra Perrone & Ying Fan & Mohammad Shamsudduha & Richard G. Taylor & Othman Fallatah & James W. Kirchner, 2024. "Rapid groundwater decline and some cases of recovery in aquifers globally," Nature, Nature, vol. 625(7996), pages 715-721, January.
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    10. Yang, Yuzhi & Ansink, Erik & Gudmundsson, Jens, 2025. "How to pollute a river if you must," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    11. Ricardo Martínez & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2025. "The Allocation of Riparian Water Rights," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 88(12), pages 3841-3872, December.
    12. Browne, Oliver R. & Ji, Xinde James, 2023. "The Economic Value of Clarifying Property Rights: Evidence from Water in Idaho’s Snake River Basin," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
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    Cited by:

    1. Encarnaci'on Algaba & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero & Eric R'emila & Philippe Solal, 2026. "Intergenerational geometric transfers of income," Papers 2603.09280, arXiv.org.

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