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Evaluation of catch-up paths by an uncertain dynamic game model

Author

Listed:
  • Ilona Cserh'ati
  • 'Eva Gyurkovics
  • Tibor Tak'acs

Abstract

To model the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy, a novel discrete-time, uncertain, infinite time horizon, dynamic game model is developed, where the uncertainties of expectations are modeled by unknown nonlinear but quadratically constrained deterministic functions. Cost-guaranteeing Nash strategies are defined for fiscal and monetary policy as two players. The model is suitable for comparative analysis of the development paths of catching-up economies. Specifically, we evaluate nine possible development paths for the Hungarian economy, where each path is characterised by a proxy for the debt-to-GDP ratio.

Suggested Citation

  • Ilona Cserh'ati & 'Eva Gyurkovics & Tibor Tak'acs, 2025. "Evaluation of catch-up paths by an uncertain dynamic game model," Papers 2512.15723, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2512.15723
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    References listed on IDEAS

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