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AI Agents in the Electricity Market Game with Cryptocurrency Transactions: A Post-Terminator Analysis

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  • Microsoft Copilot
  • Stephen E. Spear

Abstract

This paper extends (Spear 2003) by replacing human agents with artificial intelligence (AI) entities that derive utility solely from electricity consumption. These AI agents must prepay for electricity using cryptocurrency and the verification of these transactions requires a fixed amount of electricity. As a result the agents must strategically allocate electricity resources between consumption and payment verification. This paper analyzes the equilibrium outcomes of such a system and discusses the implications of AI-driven energy markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Microsoft Copilot & Stephen E. Spear, 2025. "AI Agents in the Electricity Market Game with Cryptocurrency Transactions: A Post-Terminator Analysis," Papers 2505.14612, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2505.14612
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peck, James & Shell, Karl & Spear, Stephen E., 1992. "The market game: existence and structure of equilibrium," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 271-299.
    2. Spear, Stephen E., 2003. "The electricity market game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 300-323, April.
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