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When Incentives and Nudges Meet: Promoting Budget Allocations for Undervalued Policies

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  • Makoto Kuroki
  • Shusaku Sasaki

Abstract

Budget officers often assess public project proposals based on available financial support and expected outcomes. However, behavioral factors such as time discounting and psychological hesitation may lead to underinvestment in programs with delayed but significant benefits. This study investigates whether financial incentives and non-financial nudges can influence budgetary decisions in local governments. We conducted a nationwide mail-based survey experiment targeting budget officers in Japanese municipalities and received 490 valid responses. Using a 2*2 randomized design, we tested the independent and combined effects of a financial incentive (a 50% national subsidy) and a non-financial nudge (loss framing and peer information). All three treatments significantly increased assessed budget amounts compared to the control group. The largest effect appeared in the combination group (approximately 1.1 million JPY higher, p

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  • Makoto Kuroki & Shusaku Sasaki, 2025. "When Incentives and Nudges Meet: Promoting Budget Allocations for Undervalued Policies," Papers 2505.08323, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2505.08323
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