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A Generalised $\lambda$-Core Concept for Normal Form Games

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  • Subhadip Chakrabarti
  • Robert P Gilles
  • Lina Mallozzi

Abstract

In this note we develop a generalisation of the $\lambda$-Core solution for non-cooperative games in normal form. We show that this generalised $\lambda$-Core is non-empty for the class of separable games that admit a socially optimal Nash equilibrium. Examples are provided that indicate that non-emptiness of the generalised $\lambda$-Core cannot be expected for large classes of normal form games.

Suggested Citation

  • Subhadip Chakrabarti & Robert P Gilles & Lina Mallozzi, 2024. "A Generalised $\lambda$-Core Concept for Normal Form Games," Papers 2408.06086, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2408.06086
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    3. Reddy, Puduru V. & Zaccour, Georges, 2016. "A friendly computable characteristic function," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 18-25.
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