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Continuous Social Networks

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  • Juli'an Chitiva
  • Xavier Venel

Abstract

We develop an extension of the classical model of DeGroot (1974) to a continuum of agents when they interact among them according to a DiKernel. We show that, under some regularity assumptions, the continuous model is the limit case of the discrete one. Additionally, we establish sufficient conditions for the emergence of consensus. We provide some applications of these results. First, we establish a canonical way to reduce the dimensionality of matrices by comparing matrices of different dimensions in the space of DiKernels. Then, we develop a model of Lobby Competition where two lobbies compete to bias the opinion of a continuum of agents. We give sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash Equilibrium and study their relation with the equilibria of discretizations of the game. Finally, we characterize the equilibrium for a particular case of DiKernels.

Suggested Citation

  • Juli'an Chitiva & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Continuous Social Networks," Papers 2407.11710, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2025.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2407.11710
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    References listed on IDEAS

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