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Turning the Ratchet: Dynamic Screening with Multiple Agents

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  • Mehmet Ekmekci
  • Lucas Maestri
  • Dong Wei

Abstract

We study a dynamic contracting problem with multiple agents and limited commitment. A principal seeks to screen efficient agents using one-period contracts, but is tempted to revise contract terms upon knowing an agent's type. Alterations of contracts are observable and, hence, whenever past promises are broken future information revelation stops. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which information revelation can be fostered. For sufficiently patient players, private information is either never revealed or fully revealed in a sequential manner. Optimal contracts provide high-powered incentives upon initial disclosure of an agent's type, and rewards for information revelation vanish over time.

Suggested Citation

  • Mehmet Ekmekci & Lucas Maestri & Dong Wei, 2024. "Turning the Ratchet: Dynamic Screening with Multiple Agents," Papers 2405.04468, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2025.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2405.04468
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gerardi, Dino & Maestri, Lucas, 2020. "Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
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