Densely Entangled Financial Systems

In [1] Zawadoski introduces a banking network model in which the asset and counter-party risks are treated separately and the banks hedge their assets risks by appropriate OTC contracts. In his model, each bank has only two counter-party neighbors, a bank fails due to the counter-party risk only if at least one of its two neighbors default, and such a counter-party risk is a low probability event. Informally, the author shows that the banks will hedge their asset risks by appropriate OTC contracts, and, though it may be socially optimal to insure against counter-party risk, in equilibrium banks will {\em not} choose to insure this low probability event. In this paper, we consider the above model for more general network topologies, namely when each node has exactly 2r counter-party neighbors for some integer r>0. We extend the analysis of [1] to show that as the number of counter-party neighbors increase the probability of counter-party risk also increases, and in particular the socially optimal solution becomes privately sustainable when each bank hedges its risk to at least n/2 banks, where n is the number of banks in the network, i.e., when 2r is at least n/2, banks not only hedge their asset risk but also hedge its counter-party risk.