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Finanzas Subnacionales y Federalismo Fiscal. La coparticipación de impuestos desde el km 0. Principios y el caso argentino

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  • Alberto Porto

Abstract

Esta nota tiene una finalidad didáctica en el tema de la coparticipación de impuestos. Se parte de principios teóricos y se aplican al caso argentino. Se presentan los conflictos que surgen en la organización fiscal federal entre la centralización tributaria que minimiza las pérdidas de eficiencia de la recaudación y la descentralización de los gastos subnacionales que es requerida para la eficiencia. Hay varias alternativas para el conflicto centralizacióndescentralización. Una solución es descentralización de gastos y recaudación con maximización en cada jurisdicción que, en presencia de disparidades territoriales, hará que no exista igualdad de oportunidades y se alentarán migraciones ineficientes. La otra solución extrema es que todas las decisiones se centralicen con lo que se minimizan los costos de recaudación, pero con pérdidas de eficiencia si difieren las preferencias entre las regiones. Una solución para enfrentar esos conflictos, que es la que surge de la teoría del federalismo fiscal, de la práctica de casi todos los países del mundo y es coherente con la historia argentina y con la Constitución Nacional de 1994, es que la nación recaude impuestos que luego se comparten con las provincias de modo que exista “correspondencia fiscal marginal”. Al final de la nota surge la pregunta de si las transferencias (la coparticipación) son un “curiosum” de la Argentina y si también es un “curiosum” el componente de igualación fiscal de esas transferencias. Se agregan ideas generales para el futuro.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Porto, 2025. "Finanzas Subnacionales y Federalismo Fiscal. La coparticipación de impuestos desde el km 0. Principios y el caso argentino," CEFIP, Working Papers 051, CEFIP, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.
    • Handle: RePEc:akh:wcefip:051
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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