IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jsusta/v11y2019i6p1776-d216803.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Regional Competition, Labor Force Mobility, and the Fiscal Behaviour of Local Governments in China

Author

Listed:
  • Gangqiang Yang

    (Institute for the Development of Central China, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China)

  • Hong Chen

    (Institute for the Development of Central China, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China)

  • Xia Meng

    (China University of Geosciences (Wuhan), Wuhan 430074, China)

Abstract

At present, China is in a critical period of transition from labor-intensive industries to capital- and technology-intensive industries. Accordingly, the increasing labor force mobility among Chinese cities has promoted competition over production factors among regions, having a significant impact on local governments’ fiscal expenditure structure. A theoretical analysis shows that the competition of livelihood public good expenditures is playing an increasingly important role in the factor flow competition. Different labor forces’ demand for different public goods and local governments’ demand for different labor forces affect the structural preference of local government fiscal expenditures. Based on panel data on Chinese prefecture-level cities in 2010–2016, this paper empirically tests the impact of different labor mobilities on the structure of local government fiscal expenditures, finding that current decision making on labor mobility is increasingly sensitive to the supply of livelihood public goods, and strengthening labor mobility has reversed the expenditure bias historically caused by the government’s simple capital competition. After dividing the mobile labor force based on whether the labor is settled in the current year, the two labor force types’ demand for different livelihood public goods was found to be different. To attract different labor inflows, local governments should promote an increase in relevant livelihood public good expenditures, showing a strategic fiscal expenditure structural bias. Specifically, with increasing new added general labor mobility, local goverments will increase the proportion of fiscal expenditures on education and medical care, combined with the increase of newly added registered labor mobility, which will correspondingly increase the proportion of environmental protection expenditures.

Suggested Citation

  • Gangqiang Yang & Hong Chen & Xia Meng, 2019. "Regional Competition, Labor Force Mobility, and the Fiscal Behaviour of Local Governments in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(6), pages 1-21, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:11:y:2019:i:6:p:1776-:d:216803
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/6/1776/pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/6/1776/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hatfield, John William & Kosec, Katrina, 2013. "Federal competition and economic growth," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 144-159.
    2. Kleibergen, Frank & Paap, Richard, 2006. "Generalized reduced rank tests using the singular value decomposition," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 97-126, July.
    3. Nechyba, Thomas J. & Strauss, Robert P., 1998. "Community choice and local public services: A discrete choice approach," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 51-73, January.
    4. Chenggang Xu, 2011. "The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1076-1151, December.
    5. Keen, Michael & Marchand, Maurice, 1997. "Fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 33-53, October.
    6. Li, Hongbin & Zhou, Li-An, 2005. "Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1743-1762, September.
    7. Rapaport, Carol, 1997. "Housing Demand and Community Choice: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 243-260, September.
    8. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922.
    9. Bordignon, Massimo & Cerniglia, Floriana & Revelli, Federico, 2003. "In search of yardstick competition: a spatial analysis of Italian municipality property tax setting," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 199-217, September.
    10. Case, Anne C. & Rosen, Harvey S. & Hines, James Jr., 1993. "Budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence : Evidence from the states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 285-307, October.
    11. Matz Dahlberg & Matias Eklöf & Peter Fredriksson & Jordi Jofre-Monseny, 2012. "Estimating Preferences for Local Public Services Using Migration Data," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 49(2), pages 319-336, February.
    12. Barro, Robert J, 1990. "Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages 103-126, October.
    13. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March.
    14. J. Paul Elhorst & Sandy Fréret, 2009. "Evidence Of Political Yardstick Competition In France Using A Two‐Regime Spatial Durbin Model With Fixed Effects," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(5), pages 931-951, December.
    15. Borcherding, Thomas E & Deacon, Robert T, 1972. "The Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 891-901, December.
    16. Pi-Han Tsai, 2016. "Fiscal incentives and political budget cycles in China," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(6), pages 1030-1073, December.
    17. Baicker, Katherine, 2005. "The spillover effects of state spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2-3), pages 529-544, February.
    18. Isaac Bayoh & Elena G. Irwin & Timothy Haab, 2006. "Determinants of Residential Location Choice: How Important Are Local Public Goods in Attracting Homeowners to Central City Locations?," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 97-120, February.
    19. Weingast, Barry R., 2009. "Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 279-293, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pengjun Chen & Lunhui Shang, 2021. "Does Reduction of Contribution Rate Affect the Sustainability of China’s Basic Endowment Insurance Fund?—Based on the Background of National Pooling and Collection Responsibility Transformation," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(16), pages 1-13, August.
    2. Yumin Shu & Zhongying Qi, 2020. "The Effect of Market-Oriented Government Fiscal Expenditure on the Evolution of Industrial Structure: Evidence from Shenzhen, China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(9), pages 1-17, May.
    3. Yunwei Li & Qiuping Ji & Zijie Wang & Zishan Xiong & Simeng Zhan & Yiping Yang & Yu Hao, 2022. "Green energy mismatch, industrial intelligence and economics growth: theory and empirical evidence from China," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 24(10), pages 11785-11816, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Yu, Jihai & Zhou, Li-An & Zhu, Guozhong, 2016. "Strategic interaction in political competition: Evidence from spatial effects across Chinese cities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 23-37.
    2. Borck, Rainald & Fossen, Frank M. & Freier, Ronny & Martin, Thorsten, 2015. "Race to the debt trap? — Spatial econometric evidence on debt in German municipalities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 20-37.
    3. Shi, Xiangyu & Xi, Tianyang, 2018. "Race to safety: Political competition, neighborhood effects, and coal mine deaths in China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 79-95.
    4. Yihua Yu & Jing Wang & Xi Tian, 2016. "Identifying the Flypaper Effect in the Presence of Spatial Dependence: Evidence from Education in China's Counties," Growth and Change, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 93-110, March.
    5. Wang, Jian & Wu, Qun & Yan, Siqi & Guo, Guancheng & Peng, Shangui, 2020. "China’s local governments breaking the land use planning quota: A strategic interaction perspective," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    6. Sebastian Langer, 2019. "Expenditure interactions between municipalities and the role of agglomeration forces: a spatial analysis for North Rhine-Westphalia," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 62(3), pages 497-527, June.
    7. Hanming Fang & Ming Li & Zenan Wu, 2022. "Tournament-Style Political Competition and Local Protectionism: Theory and Evidence from China," NBER Working Papers 30780, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Terra, Rafael & Mattos, Enlinson, 2017. "Accountability and yardstick competition in the public provision of education," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 15-30.
    9. John I. Carruthers & Gudmundur F. Úlfarsson, 2008. "Does `Smart Growth' Matter to Public Finance?," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 45(9), pages 1791-1823, August.
    10. David Bartolini & Raffaella Santolini, 2012. "Political yardstick competition among Italian municipalities on spending decisions," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 49(1), pages 213-235, August.
    11. Isen, Adam, 2014. "Do local government fiscal spillovers exist? Evidence from counties, municipalities, and school districts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 57-73.
    12. Sandy Fréret & Denis Maguain, 2017. "The effects of agglomeration on tax competition: evidence from a two-regime spatial panel model on French data," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(6), pages 1100-1140, December.
    13. Galletta, Sergio, 2017. "Law enforcement, municipal budgets and spillover effects: Evidence from a quasi-experiment in Italy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 90-105.
    14. Francisco J. Delgado & Santiago Lago-Peñas & Matías Mayor, 2015. "On The Determinants Of Local Tax Rates: New Evidence From Spain," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(2), pages 351-368, April.
    15. Cassette, Aurélie & Creel, Jérôme & Farvaque, Etienne & Paty, Sonia, 2013. "Governments under influence: Country interactions in discretionary fiscal policy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 79-89.
    16. Saeid Mahdavi & Joakim Westerlund, 2017. "Are state–local government expenditures converging? New evidence based on sequential unit root tests," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 373-403, September.
    17. Tengku Munawar Chalil, 2020. "Fiscal competitions among Indonesian municipalities: a spatial econometric analysis," Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 241-260, February.
    18. Geys, Benny, 2006. "Looking across borders: A test of spatial policy interdependence using local government efficiency ratings," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 443-462, November.
    19. Luis Ayala & Ana Herrero & Jorge Martinez‐Vazquez, 2021. "Welfare benefits in highly decentralized fiscal systems: Evidence on interregional mimicking," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(5), pages 1178-1208, October.
    20. Revelli, Federico, 2006. "Performance rating and yardstick competition in social service provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(3), pages 459-475, February.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:11:y:2019:i:6:p:1776-:d:216803. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.