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Slotting Allowances, Failure Fees And Asymmetric Information In The Grocery Supply Chain

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  • DeVuyst, Cheryl Sinn

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Suggested Citation

  • DeVuyst, Cheryl Sinn, 2000. "Slotting Allowances, Failure Fees And Asymmetric Information In The Grocery Supply Chain," 2000 Annual Meeting, June 29-July 1, 2000, Vancouver, British Columbia 36388, Western Agricultural Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:waeava:36388
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.36388
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    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/36388/files/sp00de01.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Edward W. McLaughlin & Vithala R. Rao, 1990. "The Strategic Role of Supermarket Buyer Intermediaries in New Product Selection: Implications for Systemwide Efficiency," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 72(2), pages 358-370.
    2. Wujin Chu, 1992. "Demand Signalling and Screening in Channels of Distribution," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 11(4), pages 327-347.
    3. Martin A. Lariviere & V. Padmanabhan, 1997. "Slotting Allowances and New Product Introductions," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 16(2), pages 112-128.
    4. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-855, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Adam D. Rennhoff, 2004. "Paying For Shelf Space: An Investigation Of Merchandising Allowances In The Grocery Industry," Food Marketing Policy Center Research Reports 084, University of Connecticut, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Charles J. Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy.
    2. Rennhoff, Adam D., 2004. "Paying For Shelf Space: An Investigation Of Merchandising Allowances In The Grocery Industry," Research Reports 25155, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.
    3. Geng, Qin & Minutolo, Marcel C., 2010. "Failure fee under stochastic demand and information asymmetry," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 269-279, November.

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