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On Prevention and Control of an Uncertain Biological Invasion

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  • Olson, Lars J.
  • Roy, Santanu

Abstract

This paper examines how optimal prevention and control policies depend on the economic and biological characteristics of a randomly introduced biological invasion where the objective is to minimize the expected social costs from prevention, control, and invasion damages. The results characterize how optimal prevention and control policies vary with the initial invasion size, the invasion growth rate, and the probability distribution of introductions. The paper also examines the conditions under which the optimal policy relies solely on either prevention or control, the conditions under which it is optimal to completely prevent new introductions, and the conditions under which eradication of established invasions is optimal.

Suggested Citation

  • Olson, Lars J. & Roy, Santanu, 2005. "On Prevention and Control of an Uncertain Biological Invasion," Working Papers 28595, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:umdrwp:28595
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.28595
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ormiston Michael B. & Schlee Edward E., 1993. "Comparative Statics under Uncertainty for a Class of Economic Agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 412-422, December.
    2. Lars J. Olson & Santanu Roy, 2002. "The Economics of Controlling a Stochastic Biological Invasion," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1311-1316.
    3. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
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    Resource /Energy Economics and Policy;

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