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Land Rights, Farmer Investments Incentives, And Agricultural Production In China

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Li, Guo
  • Rozelle, Scott
  • Huang, Jikun

Abstract

The overall goal of our paper is to estimate the impact of China's land rights on farm investment incentives and agricultural production. To meet the goal, the paper pursues three specific objectives. First, the paper briefly reviews the various linkages between land rights and investment incentives. Next, we demonstrate how land use behavior differs according to the tenure regime and land rights. Third, by using our field survey data, this paper identifies the links between specific land rights, instead of just the land tenure type, and investment incentives. The paper also measures the size of efficiency loss from the current land rights arrangements.

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File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/11958
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Paper provided by University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics in its series Working Papers with number 11958.

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Length:
Date of creation: 2000
Handle: RePEc:ags:ucdavw:11958
Contact details of provider: Phone: 530-752-1517
Fax: 530-752-5614
Web page: http://www.agecon.ucdavis.edu/

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Keywords: Farm Management; Land Economics/Use;

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  1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
  2. Dwayne Benjamin & Loren Brandt, 2002. "Property rights, labour markets, and efficiency in a transition economy: the case of rural China," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 35(4), pages 689-716, November.
  3. Kung James, Kaising, 1995. "Equal Entitlement versus Tenure Security under a Regime of Collective Property Rights: Peasants' Preference for Institutions in Post-reform Chinese Agriculture," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 82-111, August.
  4. Hanan G. Jacoby & Guo Li & Scott Rozelle, 2002. "Hazards of Expropriation: Tenure Insecurity and Investment in Rural China," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1420-1447, December.
  5. Feder, Gershon, et al, 1992. "The Determinants of Farm Investment and Residential Construction in Post-Reform China," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 1-26, October.
  6. Xiao-Yuan Dong, 2000. "Public investment, social services and productivity of Chinese household farms," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(3), pages 100-122.
  7. Eggertsson,Thrainn, 1990. "Economic Behavior and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521348911, February.
  8. Shaban, Radwan Ali, 1987. "Testing between Competing Models of Sharecropping," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 893-920, October.
  9. Brandt, Loren, 1987. "Farm Household Behavior, Factor Markets, and the Distributive Consequences of Commercialization in Early Twentieth-Century China," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(03), pages 711-737, September.
  10. Dong, Xiao-Yuan, 1996. "Two-tier land tenure system and sustained economic growth in post-1978 rural China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 915-928, May.
  11. Besley, Timothy, 1995. "Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 903-937, October.
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Cited by:

  1. Ping Qin & Fredrik Carlsson & Jintao Xu, 2011. "Forest Tenure Reform in China: A Choice Experiment on Farmers’ Property Rights Preferences," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 87(3), pages 473-487.

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