Land Rights, Farmer Investments Incentives, And Agricultural Production In China
The overall goal of our paper is to estimate the impact of China's land rights on farm investment incentives and agricultural production. To meet the goal, the paper pursues three specific objectives. First, the paper briefly reviews the various linkages between land rights and investment incentives. Next, we demonstrate how land use behavior differs according to the tenure regime and land rights. Third, by using our field survey data, this paper identifies the links between specific land rights, instead of just the land tenure type, and investment incentives. The paper also measures the size of efficiency loss from the current land rights arrangements.
|Date of creation:||2000|
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