IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/quedwp/274723.html

Blockchain-based Settlement for Asset Trading

Author

Listed:
  • Chiu, Jonathan
  • Koeppl, Thorsten

Abstract

Can securities be settled on a blockchain and, if so, what are the gains relative to existing settlement systems? We consider a blockchain that ensures delivery-vs-payment by linking transfers of assets with payments and operates via a Proof-of-Work protocol. The main problem is to overcome settlement fails where participants fork the chain to get rid of trading losses. To deter forking, the blockchain needs to restrict block size and block time in order to generate sucient transaction fees which nance costly mining. We show that large enough trading volume, suciently strong preferences for fast settlement and limited trade size and risk are necessary conditions for blockchain-based settlement to be feasible. Despite mining being a deadweight cost, our estimates based on the market for US corporate debt show that gains from moving to faster and more exible settlement are in the range of 1-4 bps relative to existing legacy settlement systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Chiu, Jonathan & Koeppl, Thorsten, 2018. "Blockchain-based Settlement for Asset Trading," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers 274723, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:quedwp:274723
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.274723
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/274723/files/qed_wp_1397.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.274723?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lin William Cong & Zhiguo He, 2019. "Blockchain Disruption and Smart Contracts," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(5), pages 1754-1797.
    2. Michael J. Fleming & Kenneth D. Garbade, 2005. "Explaining settlement fails," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 11(Sep).
    3. Evangelos Benos & Rodney Garratt & Pedro Gurrola-Perez, 2017. "The economics of distributed ledger technology for securities settlement," Bank of England working papers 670, Bank of England.
    4. Huberman, Gur & Leshno, Jacob & Moalleni, Ciamac, 2017. "Monopoly Without a Monopolist: An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System," CEPR Discussion Papers 12322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Darrell Duffie & Nicolae Gârleanu & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2007. "Valuation in Over-the-Counter Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 20(6), pages 1865-1900, November.
    6. Huberman, Gur & Leshno, Jacob D. & Moallemi, Ciamac, 2017. "Monopoly without a monopolist: An economic analysis of the bitcoin payment system," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 27/2017, Bank of Finland.
    7. Ruttenberg, Wiebe & Pinna, Andrea, 2016. "Distributed ledger technologies in securities post-trading - Revolution or evolution?," Occasional Paper Series 172, European Central Bank.
    8. Bruno Biais & Christophe Bisière & Matthieu Bouvard & Catherine Casamatta, 2019. "The Blockchain Folk Theorem," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(5), pages 1662-1715.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Raphael Auer, 2019. "Embedded supervision: how to build regulation into blockchain finance," BIS Working Papers 811, Bank for International Settlements.
    2. Lin William Cong & Zhiguo He & Jiasun Li & Wei Jiang, 2021. "Decentralized Mining in Centralized Pools [Concentrating on the fall of the labor share]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 34(3), pages 1191-1235.
    3. Julien Prat & Benjamin Walter, 2021. "An Equilibrium Model of the Market for Bitcoin Mining," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(8), pages 2415-2452.
    4. Schuster, Philipp & Theissen, Erik & Uhrig-Homburg, Marliese, 2020. "Finanzwirtschaftliche Anwendungen der Blockchain-Technologie," CFR Working Papers 20-02, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    5. Rico-Peña, Juan Jesús & Arguedas-Sanz, Raquel & López-Martin, Carmen, 2023. "Models used to characterise blockchain features. A systematic literature review and bibliometric analysis," Technovation, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    6. Yukun Liu & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2018. "Risks and Returns of Cryptocurrency," NBER Working Papers 24877, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Ferreira, Daniel & Li, Jin & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2019. "Corporate Capture of Blockchain Governance," CEPR Discussion Papers 13493, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Allen, Franklin & Barbalau, Adelina, 2024. "Security design: A review," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    9. Gilles Hilary & Laura Xiaolei Liu, 2021. "Blockchain and Other Distributed Ledger Technologies in Finance," Springer Books, in: Raghavendra Rau & Robert Wardrop & Luigi Zingales (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Technological Finance, pages 243-268, Springer.
    10. Bonaparte, Yosef & Bernile, Gennaro, 2023. "A new “Wall Street Darling?” effects of regulation sentiment in cryptocurrency markets," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    11. Philipp Schuster & Erik Theissen & Marliese Uhrig-Homburg, 2020. "Finanzwirtschaftliche Anwendungen der Blockchain-Technologie [Applications of Blockchain Technology in Finance]," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 125-147, June.
    12. Benigno, Pierpaolo & Schilling, Linda M. & Uhlig, Harald, 2022. "Cryptocurrencies, currency competition, and the impossible trinity," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    13. Anil Savio Kavuri & Alistair Milne, 2019. "Fintech and the Future of Financial Services: What Are the Research Gaps?," CAMA Working Papers 2019-18, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    14. Schmück, Kilian & Schückes, Magnus & Gutmann, Tobias & Gassmann, Oliver, 2025. "Less trust, more truth: Implications and design choices for business models and platform ecosystems in the age of Web3," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    15. Makarov, Igor & Schoar, Antoinette, 2018. "Trading and Arbitrage in Cryptocurrency Markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118909, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    16. Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement," DSSR Discussion Papers 111, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
    17. Emanuele Borgonovo & Stefano Caselli & Alessandra Cillo & Donato Masciandaro, 2018. "Between Cash, Deposit And Bitcoin: Would We Like A Central Bank Digital Currency? Money Demand And Experimental Economics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1875, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    18. Joseph Abadi & Markus Brunnermeier, 2018. "Blockchain Economics," NBER Working Papers 25407, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Zhengyang Bao & Andreas Leibbrandt & ple391, 2019. "Thar she resurges: The case of assets that lack positive fundamental value," Monash Economics Working Papers 12-19, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    20. Nikhil Malik & Manmohan Aseri & Param Vir Singh & Kannan Srinivasan, 2022. "Why Bitcoin Will Fail to Scale?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(10), pages 7323-7349, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • P43 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Finance; Public Finance

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:quedwp:274723. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/qedquca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.