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Economic Incentives For Soil Conservation: A Dinamic Game Model


  • Benito Amaro, I.


This paper presents a theoretical model to analyze the incentives for protecting soil productivity in presence of separation of property and control in agricultural land. Using a dynamic model of contracts between the landlords and operators we analyze the incentives of different type of contracts (fixed rate contracts or sharecropping contracts) and their potential impact on soil conservation. The main research question of this paper is: do landlords and tenants have conflicting incentives regarding soil conservation? Our theoretical results are consistent with previous empirical literature that find that, depending on the contract specifications, there are no conflicting incentives.

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  • Benito Amaro, I., 2018. "Economic Incentives For Soil Conservation: A Dinamic Game Model," 2018 Conference, July 28-August 2, 2018, Vancouver, British Columbia 275871, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:iaae18:275871
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275871

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    1. Marcos Gallacher, 2004. "Estructura de empresa y adopción de tecnología: Conservación de suelos," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 273, Universidad del CEMA.
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    Agricultural and Food Policy; Land Economics/Use;

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