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Class, Community, Inequality

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  • Dasgupta, Indraneel
  • Kanbur, Ravi

Abstract

We investigate how voluntary contributions to community-specific public goods affect (a) the relationship between inequality of incomes and inequality of welfare outcomes, and (b) individuals’ material incentives for supporting income redistribution. We show that the nominal distribution of income could give quite a misleading picture of real inequality and tensions in society, both within and between communities. We also analyze the impact of alternative patterns of income growth on welfare inequality, and show that, somewhat paradoxically, individuals sometimes have incentives for opposing redistribution programs from which they themselves stand to receive income increments. This arises because of the complicating role of public goods, and has strong implications for class and community solidarity.

Suggested Citation

  • Dasgupta, Indraneel & Kanbur, Ravi, 2001. "Class, Community, Inequality," Working Papers 127671, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:cudawp:127671
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.127671
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Indraneel Dasgupta & Ravi Kanbur, 2005. "Community and anti-poverty targeting," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 3(3), pages 281-302, December.
    2. Dasgupta, Indraneel & Kanbur, Ravi, 2002. "How Workers Get Poor Because Capitalists Get Rich: A General Equilibrium Model of Labor Supply, Community, and the Class Distribution of Income," Working Papers 127296, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    3. Santanu Gupta & Raghbendra Jha, 2006. "Local public goods in a democracy: Theory and evidence from rural India," ASARC Working Papers 2006-06, The Australian National University, Australia South Asia Research Centre.
    4. Dasgupta, Indraneel & Kanbur, Ravi, 2003. "Bridging Communal Divides: Separation, Patronage, Integration," Working Papers 127235, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    5. Kanbur, Ravi & Tuomala, Matti, 2002. "Understanding The Evolution Of Inequality During Transition: The Optimal Income Taxation," Working Papers 7240, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    6. Araujo, M. Caridad & Ferreira, Francisco H.G. & Lanjouw, Peter & Özler, Berk, 2008. "Local inequality and project choice: Theory and evidence from Ecuador," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1022-1046, June.

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