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Quantifying the Relative Importance of Village Leaders' Multiple Objectives in China's Reform Economy

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  • Rozelle, Scott
  • Boisvert, Richard N.

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  • Rozelle, Scott & Boisvert, Richard N., "undated". "Quantifying the Relative Importance of Village Leaders' Multiple Objectives in China's Reform Economy," 1991 Annual Meeting, August 4-7, Manhattan, Kansas 271351, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea91:271351
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.271351
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fulton, Murray & Karp, Larry, 1989. "Estimating the objectives of a public firm in a natural resource industry," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 268-287, May.
    2. James A. Mirrlees, 1976. "The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 105-131, Spring.
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