IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/aaea25/360980.html

Flood Risk and Differential Firm Investment: Evidence from Dakar, Senegal

Author

Listed:
  • Doruska, Molly

Abstract

Rapid urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa is increasing exposure to and damage from flooding. Many firms located in flood prone areas suffer yearly losses, but they face limitations in their ability to make defensive investments. In a randomized experiment with small firms in Dakar, Senegal, I decreased the cost of investment through vouchers for either cement or wooden pallets. Some firms made their voucher choice in a group setting to highlight potential spillovers from investments. Firms who received vouchers made defensive investments at higher rates. However, only firms who got vouchers in a group setting experienced less flood losses and were less likely to close due to a flood. Furthermore, firms located downhill of other firms who got vouchers individually were more likely to close due to a flood. These results suggest that coordination matters for defensive investments as individuals investments can create negative externalities for those nearby.

Suggested Citation

  • Doruska, Molly, 2025. "Flood Risk and Differential Firm Investment: Evidence from Dakar, Senegal," 2025 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2025, Denver, CO 360980, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea25:360980
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.360980
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/360980/files/75263_104121_105300_Doruska_Seasonal_Flooding_Dakar_61225.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.360980?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Anderson, Michael L., 2008. "Multiple Inference and Gender Differences in the Effects of Early Intervention: A Reevaluation of the Abecedarian, Perry Preschool, and Early Training Projects," Journal of the American Statistical Association, American Statistical Association, vol. 103(484), pages 1481-1495.
    2. Benjamin Feigenberg & Erica Field & Rohini Pande, 2013. "The Economic Returns to Social Interaction: Experimental Evidence from Microfinance," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(4), pages 1459-1483.
    3. Allan Hsiao, 2025. "Sea Level Rise and Urban Infrastructure," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 115, pages 557-562, May.
    4. Kerwin, Jason & Rostom, Nada & Sterck, Olivier, 2024. "Striking the Right Balance: Why Standard Balance Tests Over-Reject the Null, and How to Fix It," IZA Discussion Papers 17217, IZA Network @ LISER.
    5. Sajid, Osama & Bevis, Leah E.M., 2021. "Flooding and child health: Evidence from Pakistan," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    6. Jonathan Morduch, 1999. "The Microfinance Promise," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1569-1614, December.
    7. Kirill Borusyak & Peter Hull, 2023. "Nonrandom Exposure to Exogenous Shocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(6), pages 2155-2185, November.
    8. Conley, T. G., 1999. "GMM estimation with cross sectional dependence," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 1-45, September.
    9. David S. Lee, 2009. "Training, Wages, and Sample Selection: Estimating Sharp Bounds on Treatment Effects," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(3), pages 1071-1102.
    10. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
    11. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1995. "Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-18, February.
    12. Lentz, Erin & Ouma, Robert & Mude, Andrew, 2016. "Does peer monitoring influence choices between cash and food? Findings from a field experiment," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 21-31.
    13. Wolfram Schlenker & W. Reed Walker, 2016. "Airports, Air Pollution, and Contemporaneous Health," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(2), pages 768-809.
    14. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Timothy Besley & Timothy W. Guinnane, 1994. "Thy Neighbor's Keeper: The Design of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(2), pages 491-515.
    15. Wyatt Brooks & Kevin Donovan, 2020. "Eliminating Uncertainty in Market Access: The Impact of New Bridges in Rural Nicaragua," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 1965-1997, September.
    16. Townsend, Robert M, 1994. "Risk and Insurance in Village India," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 539-591, May.
    17. Baland, Jean-Marie & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2003. "Economics of common property management regimes," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 127-190, Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Herr, Annika & Karimi, Soschia & Wichert, Julian, 2026. "Weather shocks, recall error and health," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    2. repec:osf:osfxxx:wqcv2_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Chowdhury, Shyamal & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy & Sengupta, Kunal, 2014. "Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 167-180.
    4. Ashok S. Rai & Tomas Sjostrom, "undated". "Is Grameen Lending Efficient?," CID Working Papers 40, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    5. Cornée, Simon & Masclet, David, 2022. "Long-term relationships, group lending, and peer monitoring in microfinance: Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    6. Oriana Bandiera & Robin Burgess & Erika Deserranno & Ricardo Morel & Imran Rasul & Munshi Sulaiman & Jack Thiemel, 2022. "Microfinance and Diversification," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(S1), pages 239-275, June.
    7. Hisaki KONO & Kazushi TAKAHASHI, 2010. "Microfinance Revolution: Its Effects, Innovations, And Challenges," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 48(1), pages 15-73, March.
    8. Nandrasa, Tiava, 2022. "The financial behavior of households in the face of climate change," OSF Preprints wqcv2, Center for Open Science.
    9. Dhami, Sanjit & Arshad, Junaid & al-Nowaihi, Ali, 2022. "Psychological and social motivations in microfinance contracts: Theory and evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    10. Fischer, Gregory, 2013. "Contract structure, risk sharing and investment choice," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 46796, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    11. Orazio Attanasio & Britta Augsburg & Ralph De Haas, 2019. "Microcredit Contracts, Risk Diversification and Loan Take-Up," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(6), pages 1797-1842.
    12. Joel M. Guttman, 2006. "Repayment Performance in Group Lending Programs: A Survey," NFI Working Papers 2006-WP-01, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    13. Hameem Raees Chowdhury, 2016. "Joint-Liability in Microcredit: Evidence from Bangladesh," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 44(1), pages 105-129, March.
    14. Gustavo A. Barboza & Humberto Barreto, 2006. "Learning By Association: Micro Credit In Chiapas, Mexico," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(2), pages 316-331, April.
    15. Allen, Treb, 2016. "Optimal (partial) group liability in microfinance lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 201-216.
    16. João Paulo Coelho Ribeiro & Fábio Duarte & Ana Paula Matias Gama, 2022. "Does microfinance foster the development of its clients? A bibliometric analysis and systematic literature review," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 8(1), pages 1-35, December.
    17. Attanasio, O.P. & Augsburg, B. & de Haas, R. & Fitzsimons, E. & Harmgart, H., 2013. "Group Lending or Individual Lending? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Rural Mongolia," Discussion Paper 2013-074, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    18. Emilios Galariotis & Christophe Villa & Nurmukhammad Yusupov, 2011. "Recent Advances in Lending to the Poor with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(9), pages 1371-1390, July.
    19. Gutiérrez-Nieto, Begoña & Serrano-Cinca, Carlos, 2019. "20 years of research in microfinance: An information management approach," International Journal of Information Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 183-197.
    20. Eynde, Oliver Vanden & Wren-Lewis, Liam, 2024. "Complementarities in Infrastructure: Evidence from Indian Agriculture," SocArXiv ejb8x, Center for Open Science.
    21. Kumar Aniket, 2007. "Does Subsidising the Cost of Capital Help the Poorest? An Analysis of Saving Opportunities in Group Lending," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 140, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:aaea25:360980. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aaeaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.