On the Coexistence of Spot and Contract Markets: a Delivery Requirement Explanation
A model is presented in which spot and contract market exchange co-exist. A contract consists of a delivery requirement between an upstream and a downstream party. Contract formation determines to a certain extent the probability distribution of the spot market price. This contract formation externality entails the removal of high reservation price buyers and various sellers from the spot market. The first effect decreases the expected spot market price when the number of contracts is small, whereas the decrease in the number of sellers and additional residual contract demand increase the expected spot market price beyond a certain number of contracts. It implies an endogenous upper bound on the number of contracts. Contract prices are positively related to the number of contracts. Finally, additional contracts reduce the variance of the spot market price when the number of contracts is sufficiently large.
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 555 East Wells Street, Suite 1100, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202|
Phone: (414) 918-3190
Fax: (414) 276-3349
Web page: http://www.aaea.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bajari, Patrick & Tadelis, Steven, 2001.
"Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 387-407, Autumn.
- Patrick Bajari & Steven Tadelis, 1999. "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts," Working Papers 99029, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Tian Xia & Richard J. Sexton, 2004. "The Competitive Implications of Top-of-the-Market and Related Contract-Pricing Clauses," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(1), pages 124-138.
- Claude Ménard & Peter G. Klein, 2004. "Organizational Issues in the Agrifood Sector: Toward a Comparative Approach," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(3), pages 750-755.
- Claude Ménard & Peter G. Klein, 2004. "Organizational Issues in the Agrifood Sector: Toward a Comparative Approach," Industrial Organization 0401005, EconWPA.
- Riordan, Michael H. & Williamson, Oliver E., 1985. "Asset specificity and economic organization," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 365-378, December.
- Carlton, Dennis W, 1979. "Vertical Integration in Competitive Markets under Uncertainty," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 189-209, March.
- D. W. Carlton, 1976. "Vertical Integration in Competitive Markets Under Uncertainty," Working papers 174, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:aaea06:21041. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.