Strategic Labeling And Trade Of Gmos
This paper systematically analyzes the strategic effects of national regulatory decisions on labeling of GM products and identifies the determinants of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium labeling regimes in a small number of producing countries that compete for access in the world market for an agricultural product.
|Date of creation:||2004|
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- Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
- Konstantinos Giannakas, 2002. "Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights: Causes and Consequences," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 84(2), pages 482-494.
- Murray Fulton & Konstantinos Giannakas, 2004. "Inserting GM Products into the Food Chain: The Market and Welfare Effects of Different Labeling and Regulatory Regimes," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(1), pages 42-60.
- Giannakas, Konstantinos & Fulton, Murray, 2002. "Consumption effects of genetic modification: what if consumers are right?," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 97-109, August.
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