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Working Paper 173 - Production and Conflict in Risky Elections

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  • Kjell Hausken
  • Mthuli Ncube

Abstract

An incumbent allocates in period 1 of a two period game, a resource into production, fighting with the challenger, and producing public goods, which impact the probability of winning an election. In period 2 the incumbent may accept the election result, or a coalition or standoff may follow. We analyze the strategic choices. Econometric analysis of 653 African elections 1960-2010 shows that the incumbent wins with no contestation 64%, coalition 6%, and standoff 2%. The incumbent loses and accepts defeat 16%, coalition 12%, and standoff 0%. The impact of economic performance, education, political factors, natural resources, former-colonizer, etc, are scrutinized.

Suggested Citation

  • Kjell Hausken & Mthuli Ncube, 2013. "Working Paper 173 - Production and Conflict in Risky Elections," Working Paper Series 469, African Development Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:adb:adbwps:469
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April.
    2. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
    3. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    4. Matthew Ellman & Leonard Wantchekon, 2000. "Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(2), pages 499-531.
    5. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1991. "Conflict and Attitudes toward Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 116-120, May.
    6. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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