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CEO Pay and Risk-taking in Banking: The Roles of Bonus Plans and Deferred Compensation in Curbing Bank Risk-taking

In: Research Handbook on International Banking and Governance

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  • Jens Hagendorff
  • Francesco Vallascas

Abstract

The contributors – top international scholars from finance, law and business – explore the role of governance, both internal and external, in explaining risk-taking and other aspects of the behavior of financial institutions. Additionally, they discuss market and policy features affecting objectives and quality of governance. The chapters provide in-depth analysis of factors such as: ownership, efficiency and stability; market discipline; compensation and performance; social responsibility; and governance in non-bank financial institutions. Only through this kind of rigorous examination can one hope to implement the financial reforms necessary and sufficient to reduce the likelihood and severity of future crises.

Suggested Citation

  • Jens Hagendorff & Francesco Vallascas, 2012. "CEO Pay and Risk-taking in Banking: The Roles of Bonus Plans and Deferred Compensation in Curbing Bank Risk-taking," Chapters, in: James R. Barth & Chen Lin & Clas Wihlborg (ed.), Research Handbook on International Banking and Governance, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14045_9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jiang, Wei & Liu, Yunguo & Lobo, Gerald J. & Xu, Yue, 2019. "Deferred cash compensation and risk-taking: Evidence from the Chinese banking industry," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 432-448.

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