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The Arms Trade

In: The Handbook on the Political Economy of War

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  • David Kinsella

Abstract

By defining political economy and war in the broadest sense, this unique Handbook brings together a wide range of interdisciplinary scholars from economics, political science, sociology, and policy studies to address a multitude of important topics. These include an analysis of why wars begin, how wars are waged, what happens after war has ceased, and the various alternatives to war. Other sections explore civil war and revolution, the arms trade, economic and political systems, and post-conflict reconstruction and nation building. Policymakers as well as academics and students of political science, economics, public policy and sociology will find this volume to be an engaging and enlightening read.

Suggested Citation

  • David Kinsella, 2011. "The Arms Trade," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 12, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:13385_12
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shannon Lindsey Blanton, 1999. "Instruments of Security or Tools of Repression? Arms Imports and Human Rights Conditions in Developing Countries," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 36(2), pages 233-244, March.
    2. Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Defense Economics," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 1.
    3. Garcia-Alonso, Maria D.C. & Levine, Paul, 2007. "Arms Trade and Arms Races: A Strategic Analysis," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 29, pages 941-971, Elsevier.
    4. Todd Sandler, 2000. "Arms trade, arms control, and security: Collective action issues," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 533-548.
    5. David Kinsella, 1995. "Nested rivalries: Superpower competition, arms transfers, and regional conflict, 1950–1990," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(2), pages 109-125.
    6. Paul Levine & Ron Smith, 2000. "Arms Export Controls and Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(6), pages 885-895, December.
    7. Brzoska, Michael & Ohlson, Thomas, 1987. "Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-85," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198291169.
    8. Maria Carmen Garcia-Alonso & Paul Levine, 2002. "Domestic Procurement, Subsidies, and the Arms Trade," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Jurgen Brauer & J. Paul Dunne (ed.), Arming the South, chapter 7, pages 161-191, Palgrave Macmillan.
    9. Finnemore, Martha & Sikkink, Kathryn, 1998. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 887-917, October.
    10. Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), 2011. "The Handbook on the Political Economy of War," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13385.
    11. Jurgen Brauer, 2000. "Potential and actual arms production: Implications for the arms trade debate," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 461-480.
    12. Fotis Mouzakis, 2002. "Domestic Production as an Alternative to Importing Arms," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Jurgen Brauer & J. Paul Dunne (ed.), Arming the South, chapter 6, pages 129-159, Palgrave Macmillan.
    13. Jurgen Brauer & J. Paul Dunne (ed.), 2002. "Arming the South," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-0-230-50125-6.
    14. Paul Levine & Ron Smith, 1997. "The arms trade," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 12(25), pages 336-370.
    15. Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. & Kahler, Miles & Montgomery, Alexander H., 2009. "Network Analysis for International Relations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 559-592, July.
    16. Hoff, Peter D. & Ward, Michael D., 2004. "Modeling Dependencies in International Relations Networks," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 160-175, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christopher Coyne, 2015. "Lobotomizing the defense brain," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 28(4), pages 371-396, December.

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