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Barbara Joyce Alexander

Personal Details

First Name:Barbara
Middle Name:Joyce
Last Name:Alexander
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pal342
Terminal Degree: (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

(50%) Arguendo Financial and Economic Consulting

http://www.arguendoinc.com
Boston, MA

(50%) Economics Division
Babson College

Babson Park, Massachusetts (United States)
http://www3.babson.edu/Academics/Divisions/econ/

: 781-239-4580
781-239-5239
Babson Park, MA 02457-0310
RePEc:edi:edbabus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

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Jump to: Articles

Articles

  1. Alexander, Barbara J., 2001. "Essays on the Great Depression. By Ben S. Bernanke. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. Pp. vii, 310. $35.00," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(01), pages 247-249, March.
  2. Alexander, Barbara & Libecap, Gary D., 2000. "The Effect of Cost Heterogeneity in the Success and Failure of the New Deal's Agricultural and Industrial Programs," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 370-400, October.
  3. Alexander, Barbara J., 2000. "Designing a New America: The Origins of New Deal Planning, 1890–1943. By Patrick D. Reagan. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999. Pp. viii, 362. $40.00.Civilizing Capitalism. The National ," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(04), pages 1162-1164, December.
  4. Alexander, Barbara J., 1999. "The Political Economy of the New Deal. By Jim F. Couch and William F. Shughart II. Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 1998. Pp.247. $85," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(04), pages 1127-1130, December.
  5. Alexander, Barbara J., 1998. "Economics in the Long Run: New Deal Theorists and their Legacies, 1933–1993. By Theodore Rosenof. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. Pp. 222. $34.95," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 58(01), pages 261-262, March.
  6. Alexander, Barbara J., 1997. "Failed Cooperation in Heterogeneous Industries Under the National Recovery Administration," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(02), pages 322-344, June.
  7. Alexander, Barbara J, 1997. "The Rational Racketeer: Pasta Protection in Depression Era Chicago," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 175-202, April.
  8. Alexander, Barbara J, 1997. "Mechanisms for Rent Transfers: Subcontracting among Military Aircraft Manufacturers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(3-4), pages 251-269, June.
  9. Alexander, Barbara, 1994. "The Impact of the National Industrial Recovery Act on Cartel Formation and Maintenance Costs," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(2), pages 245-254, May.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Articles

  1. Alexander, Barbara & Libecap, Gary D., 2000. "The Effect of Cost Heterogeneity in the Success and Failure of the New Deal's Agricultural and Industrial Programs," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 370-400, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Taylor, Jason E. & Neumann, Todd C., 2013. "The effect of institutional regime change within the new deal on industrial output and labor markets," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 582-598.
    2. Mark Chicu & Chris Vickers & Nicolas L. Ziebarth, 2012. "Cementing the Case for Collusion under the National Recovery Administration," NBER Chapters,in: The Microeconomics of New Deal Policy National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Gary Libecap & James L. Smith, 2001. "Political constraints on government cartelization: the case of oil production regulation in Texas and Saudi Arabia," ICER Working Papers 16-2001, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    4. Jason E. Taylor, 2007. "Cartel Code Attributes and Cartel Performance: An Industry-Level Analysis of the National Industrial Recovery Act," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50, pages 597-624.
    5. Taylor Jason E, 2010. "The Welfare Impact of Collusion under Various Industry Characteristics: A Panel Examination of Efficient Cartel Theory," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-29, October.

  2. Alexander, Barbara J., 1997. "Failed Cooperation in Heterogeneous Industries Under the National Recovery Administration," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(02), pages 322-344, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Jonathan B. Baker, 2003. "The Case for Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 27-50, Fall.
    2. Price V. Fishback & John Joseph Wallis, 2012. "What Was New About the New Deal?," NBER Working Papers 18271, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Normann, Hans-Theo & Tan, Elaine S., 2013. "Effects of different cartel policies: Evidence from the German power-cable industry," DICE Discussion Papers 108, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    4. Price V. Fishback, 2016. "How Successful Was the New Deal? The Microeconomic Impact of New Deal Spending and Lending Policies in the 1930s," NBER Working Papers 21925, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Nikolaus Fink & Philipp Schmidt-Dengler & Konrad Stahl & Christine Zulehner, 2015. "Registered Cartels in Austria. An Overview," WIFO Working Papers 501, WIFO.
    6. William Anderson, 2000. "Risk and the National Industrial Recovery Act: An Empirical Evaluation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 139-161, April.
    7. Chicu, Mark & Ziebarth, Nicolas L., 2013. "Multi-market contact and competition: evidence from the Depression-era portland cement industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 603-611.
    8. Jason E. Taylor, 2011. "Work‐sharing During the Great Depression: Did the ‘President's Reemployment Agreement’ Promote Reemployment?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 78(309), pages 133-158, January.
    9. Taylor, Jason E. & Neumann, Todd C., 2013. "The effect of institutional regime change within the new deal on industrial output and labor markets," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 582-598.
    10. Mark Chicu & Chris Vickers & Nicolas L. Ziebarth, 2012. "Cementing the Case for Collusion under the National Recovery Administration," NBER Chapters,in: The Microeconomics of New Deal Policy National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Alexander, Barbara & Libecap, Gary D., 2000. "The Effect of Cost Heterogeneity in the Success and Failure of the New Deal's Agricultural and Industrial Programs," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 370-400, October.
    12. Gary Libecap & James L. Smith, 2001. "Political constraints on government cartelization: the case of oil production regulation in Texas and Saudi Arabia," ICER Working Papers 16-2001, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    13. Alexander, Barbara J, 1997. "The Rational Racketeer: Pasta Protection in Depression Era Chicago," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 175-202, April.
    14. Taylor Jason E, 2010. "The Welfare Impact of Collusion under Various Industry Characteristics: A Panel Examination of Efficient Cartel Theory," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-29, October.

  3. Alexander, Barbara J, 1997. "The Rational Racketeer: Pasta Protection in Depression Era Chicago," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 175-202, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Mastrobuoni Giovanni & Patacchini Eleonora, 2012. "Organized Crime Networks: an Application of Network Analysis Techniques to the American Mafia," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 1-43, September.
    2. Lavezzi, Andrea Mario, 2008. "Economic Structure and Vulnerability to Organised Crime: Evidence from Sicily," MPRA Paper 50114, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Campaniello, Nadia & Gray, Rowena & Mastrobuoni, Giovanni, 2016. "Returns to education in criminal organizations: Did going to college help Michael Corleone?," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 242-258.
    4. Edwards Griffin Sims, 2014. "The Power of the Racketeer: An Empirical Approach," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-16, July.
    5. Mikael Priks, 2012. "Competition among officials and the abuse of power," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 425-438, March.
    6. Michele Battisti & Andrea Mario Lavezzi & Lucio Masserini & Monica Pratesi, 2014. "Resisting to the Extortion Racket: an Empirical Analysis," Working Papers LuissLab 14115, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli.
    7. Giovanni Mastrobuoni & Eleonora Patacchini, 2010. "Understanding Organized Crime Networks: Evidence Based on Federal Bureau of Narcotics Secret Files on American Mafia," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 152, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    8. Anja Shortland & Federico Varese, 2012. "The Business of Pirate Protection," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 75, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    9. Garoupa, Nuno, 2007. "Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 461-474, July.

  4. Alexander, Barbara J, 1997. "Mechanisms for Rent Transfers: Subcontracting among Military Aircraft Manufacturers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(3-4), pages 251-269, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Meland, Frode & Straume, Odd Rune, 2005. "Outsourcing in Contests," Working Papers in Economics 09/05, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.

  5. Alexander, Barbara, 1994. "The Impact of the National Industrial Recovery Act on Cartel Formation and Maintenance Costs," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(2), pages 245-254, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Claire Giordano & Ferdinando Giugliano, 2012. "A Tale of Two Fascisms: Labour Productivity Growth and Competition Policy in Italy, 1911-1951," Quaderni di storia economica (Economic History Working Papers) 28, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    2. Jonathan B. Baker, 2003. "The Case for Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 27-50, Fall.
    3. World Bank, 2013. "Republic of Turkey Reform for Competitiveness Technical Assistance : Fostering Open and Efficient Markets through Effective Competition Policies," World Bank Other Operational Studies 17010, The World Bank.
    4. Kyle Hampton & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2010. "Demand Shocks, Capacity Coordination and Industry Performance: Lessons from Economic Laboratory," Working Papers 2010-09, University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics.
    5. Krepps, Matthew B., 1999. "Facilitating practices and the path-dependence of collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(6), pages 887-901, August.
    6. Grosskopf, Shawna & Hayes, Kathy J. & Taylor, Lori L. & Weber, William L., 2001. "On the Determinants of School District Efficiency: Competition and Monitoring," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 453-478, May.
    7. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2016. "Price Fixing Hits Home: An Empirical Study of US Price-Fixing Conspiracies," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 48(4), pages 361-379, June.
    8. Rene Y. Kamita, 2010. "Analyzing the Effects of Temporary Antitrust Immunity: The Aloha-Hawaiian Immunity Agreement," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(2), pages 239-261, May.
    9. Taylor, Jason E. & Neumann, Todd C., 2016. "Recovery Spring, Faltering Fall: March to November 1933," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 54-67.
    10. Nikolaus Fink & Philipp Schmidt-Dengler & Konrad Stahl & Christine Zulehner, 2015. "Registered Cartels in Austria. An Overview," WIFO Working Papers 501, WIFO.
    11. Chicu, Mark & Ziebarth, Nicolas L., 2013. "Multi-market contact and competition: evidence from the Depression-era portland cement industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 603-611.
    12. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    13. Jason E. Taylor, 2011. "Work‐sharing During the Great Depression: Did the ‘President's Reemployment Agreement’ Promote Reemployment?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 78(309), pages 133-158, January.
    14. Taylor, Jason E. & Neumann, Todd C., 2013. "The effect of institutional regime change within the new deal on industrial output and labor markets," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 582-598.
    15. Mark Chicu & Chris Vickers & Nicolas L. Ziebarth, 2012. "Cementing the Case for Collusion under the National Recovery Administration," NBER Chapters,in: The Microeconomics of New Deal Policy National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Alexander, Barbara & Libecap, Gary D., 2000. "The Effect of Cost Heterogeneity in the Success and Failure of the New Deal's Agricultural and Industrial Programs," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 370-400, October.
    17. Levenstein, Margaret C. & Sivadasan, Jagadeesh & Suslow, Valerie Y., 2015. "The effect of competition on trade: Evidence from the collapse of international cartels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 56-70.
    18. Jason E. Taylor, 2007. "Cartel Code Attributes and Cartel Performance: An Industry-Level Analysis of the National Industrial Recovery Act," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50, pages 597-624.
    19. Alexander, Barbara J, 1997. "The Rational Racketeer: Pasta Protection in Depression Era Chicago," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 175-202, April.
    20. Taylor Jason E, 2010. "The Welfare Impact of Collusion under Various Industry Characteristics: A Panel Examination of Efficient Cartel Theory," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-29, October.

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