Public procurement cartels: A large-sample testing of screens using machine learning
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103228
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Keywords
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- C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
- C45 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Neural Networks and Related Topics
- C52 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
- D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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