Inflation Targeting under Imperfect Credibility Based on the Aggregate Rational Inflation-Targeting Model for Bank Indonesia (ARIMBI): Lessons from the Indonesian Experience
Credibility is one of the central issues in conducting monetary policy. It is necessary in order to anchor the economic agents’ expectation on the central bank’s inflation target. A central bank which is capable of managing the public’s expectation of inflation in a proper manner would able to implement monetary policy more effectively and efficiently. This paper attempts to assess the role of credibility in the implementation of the inflation targeting framework in Indonesia. It illustrates how credibility may play an important role in the evolution of the Indonesian monetary policy. Knowing the degree of credibility would be beneficial for Bank Indonesia (BI) in understanding how policy instruments can be adjusted to achieve a long-term inflation target.
|This book is provided by South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Research and Training Centre in its series Occasional Papers with number occ50 and published in 2010.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Level 5, Sasana Kijang, Bank Negara Malaysia, 2 Jalan Dato? Onn, 50480 Kuala Lumpur|
Phone: 603-9195 1888
Fax: 603-9195 1801
Web page: http://edirc.repec.org/data/seacemy.html
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lars E.O. Svensson, 1993.
"The Simplest Test of Inflation Target Credibility,"
NBER Working Papers
4604, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Svensson, Lars E O, 1994. "The Simplest Test of Inflation Target Credibility," CEPR Discussion Papers 940, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Svensson, L.E.O., 1993. "The Simplest Test of Inflation Target Credibility," Papers 560, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Stanley Fischer, 1984. "Contracts, Credibility, and Disinflation," NBER Working Papers 1339, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sea:opaper:occ50. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Yunyee)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.