Comment les banques octroient les crédits aux PME ?
The recommendations of Basel II impose to banks the use of the "hard" information in the decision making process of SMEs loans. These banks must choose between replacing the "soft" information, already used, by the "hard" information and combining the two forms of information. This thesis explores the various elements that can influence this choice and tries to get the effect of this choice on the bank performance. Since, the cost of information is a fundamental element to adopt this choice; we tried to represent a measure to this cost of information. This cost is based on the time required for the collection and processing of the information. It turns out that the use of "hard" information decreases the flexibility of banks to grant loans to SMEs, for this purpose we tried to examine the different elements that influence the decision-making. We tried to integrate the nature of information among the elements studied. The results show a positive relationship between credit availability and the use of "soft" information. Information asymmetry is a major handicap for banks to distinguish between different types of borrower so the decision of rationing can penalize the good borrowers. Banks, which fear the loss of their customers, are looking to find a solution to this situation: they adopt new activities in search to make profits from riskier loans. The latest study of our thesis tries to show the effect of such services on the volume of loans granted and the net interest margin. Keywords: "soft" information, "hard" information, bank-SME relationship, information asymmetries, credit rationing, new services, non-interest income.
|This book is provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/8003 and published in 2011.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.dauphine.fr/en/welcome.html|
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dau:thesis:123456789/8003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandre Faure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.