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The evolving European system of corporate governance: implications for worker participation

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  • Vitols, Sigurt

Abstract

This article contributes to the current battle over the character of the evolving European system of corporate governance. The claims of proponents of the shareholder value model, which has been hegemonic in European policy-making circles over the past decade, are subject to a critical examination. In particular, the claims of the governance superiority of private equity, one of the extreme'expressions of the shareholder model, are shown not to hold empirically. The concept of the sustainable company is proposed as an alternative to the shareholder value model, both because of its explicit commitment to a multidimensional understanding of welfare, and because of its extension of worker participation beyond traditional trade union concerns.

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  • Vitols, Sigurt, 2008. "The evolving European system of corporate governance: implications for worker participation," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 14(1), pages 27-43.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:343969
    DOI: 10.1177/102425890801400105
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    References listed on IDEAS

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