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Double standards: When stakeholders disagree with spectators in repugnance judgments

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  • Erkut, Hande
  • Kübler, Dorothea

Abstract

Transactions such as kidney sales or surrogacy often evoke repugnance among unaffected observers (spectators). We examine whether individuals directly involved in these transactions (stakeholders) are more accepting. In our lab experiment featuring a transaction with severe consequences and limited agency for the vulnerable party, spectators and vulnerable stakeholders largely deem it repugnant, whereas advantaged stakeholders (who have the right to make offers) are less likely to prohibit it. Spectators and vulnerable stakeholders differentiate between mild and severe outcomes, while advantaged stakeholders are accepting in both cases. All groups are more prohibitive when agency is lacking. Overall, spectators mostly align with the vulnerable, while advantaged stakeholders view the transactions more favorably.

Suggested Citation

  • Erkut, Hande & Kübler, Dorothea, 2026. "Double standards: When stakeholders disagree with spectators in repugnance judgments," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 188, pages 1-12.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:342105
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2026.105415
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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