IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/zbw/espost/222455.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How Do Inclusionary and Exclusionary Autocracies Affect Ordinary People?

Author

Listed:
  • Neundorf, Anja
  • Gerschewski, Johannes
  • Olar, Roman-Gabriel

Abstract

We propose a distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary autocratic ruling strategies and develop novel theoretical propositions on the legacy that these strategies leave on citizens’ political attitudes once the autocratic regime broke down. Using data of 1.3 million survey respondents from 71 countries and hierarchical age–period–cohort models, we estimate between and within cohort differences in citizens’ democratic support. We find that inclusionary regimes—with wider redistribution of socioeconomic and political benefits—leave a stronger antidemocratic legacy than exclusionary regimes on the political attitudes of their citizens. Similarly, citizens who were part of the winning group in an autocracy are more critical with democracy compared with citizens who were part of discriminated groups. This article contributes to our understanding about how autocracies affect the hearts and minds of ordinary citizens.

Suggested Citation

  • Neundorf, Anja & Gerschewski, Johannes & Olar, Roman-Gabriel, 2020. "How Do Inclusionary and Exclusionary Autocracies Affect Ordinary People?," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 53(12), pages 1890-1925.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:222455
    DOI: 10.1177/0010414019858958
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/222455/3/Full-text-article-Neundorf-et-al-How-do-inclusionary.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0010414019858958?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kern, Holger Lutz & Hainmueller, Jens, 2009. "Opium for the Masses: How Foreign Media Can Stabilize Authoritarian Regimes," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(4), pages 377-399.
    2. Anna Lührmann & Marcus Tannenberg & Staffan I. Lindberg, 2018. "Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening New Avenues for the Comparative Study of Political Regimes," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 6(1), pages 60-77.
    3. Anderson, Christopher J. & Guillory, Christine A., 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(1), pages 66-81, March.
    4. Gandhi,Jennifer, 2008. "Political Institutions under Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521897952, September.
    5. Sears, David O. & Valentino, Nicholas A., 1997. "Politics Matters: Political Events as Catalysts for Preadult Socialization," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(1), pages 45-65, March.
    6. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, September.
    7. Haber, Stephen & Menaldo, Victor, 2011. "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-26, February.
    8. Ansell,Ben W. & Samuels,David J., 2014. "Inequality and Democratization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107000360, September.
    9. Wagner, Alexander F. & Schneider, Friedrich & Halla, Martin, 2009. "The quality of institutions and satisfaction with democracy in Western Europe -- A panel analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 30-41, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lourdes ROJAS RUBIO, 2022. "Inequality, Corruption and Support for Democracy," THEMA Working Papers 2022-20, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    2. Michael Albertus & Victor Gay, 2019. "No better time than now: Future uncertainty and private investment under dictatorship," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 71-96, March.
    3. Kubinec, Robert & Milner, Helen, 2021. "Taxes in the Time of Revolution: An Experimental Test of the Rentier State during Algeria's Hirak," SocArXiv hu3vq, Center for Open Science.
    4. Marina Dodlova & Anna Gioblas, 2017. "Regime type, inequality, and redistributive transfers in developing countries," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2017-30, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    5. Dorsch, Michael T. & Maarek, Paul, 2020. "Economic downturns, inequality, and democratic improvements," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    6. Michael K Miller, 2013. "Electoral authoritarianism and democracy: A formal model of regime transitions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(2), pages 153-181, April.
    7. Boese-Schlosser, Vanessa A. & Eberhardt, Markus, 2024. "Democracy Doesn’t Always Happen Over Night: Regime Change in Stages and Economic Growth," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, issue Forthcomi, pages 1-29.
    8. Li, Yuan & Gilli, Mario, 2014. "Accountability in Autocracies: The Role of Revolution Threat," Stockholm School of Economics Asia Working Paper Series 2014-30, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm China Economic Research Institute, revised 06 Mar 2014.
    9. Reutzel, Fabian, 2024. "The grass is always greener on the other side: (Unfair) inequality and support for democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    10. Raouf Boucekkine & Rodolphe Desbordes & Paolo Melindi-Ghidi, 2023. "Elite-led revolutions," AMSE Working Papers 2319, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    11. Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti & Dominic Rohner & Mathias Thoenig, 2024. "Ethnic Conflict and the Informational Dividend of Democracy," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 22(1), pages 73-116.
    12. Tomoko Matsumoto & Tetsuji Okazaki, 2017. "Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan," CIGS Working Paper Series 17-004E, The Canon Institute for Global Studies.
    13. Mahdavi, Paasha, 2014. "Why do leaders nationalize the oil industry? The politics of resource expropriation," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 228-243.
    14. Francesco Caselli & Andrea Tesei, 2016. "Resource Windfalls, Political Regimes, and Political Stability," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 573-590, July.
    15. Alexander F. Wagner & Friedrich Schneider, 2006. "Satisfaction with Democracy and the Environment in Western Europe – a Panel Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 1660, CESifo.
    16. Susumu Annaka & Masaaki Higashijima, 2017. "Democratization and Human Development," Working Papers 1712, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    17. Michael Albertus & Victor Gay, 2017. "Unlikely Democrats: Economic Elite Uncertainty under Dictatorship and Support for Democratization," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(3), pages 624-641, July.
    18. Dominik Schraff & Frank Schimmelfennig, 2019. "Eurozone bailouts and national democracy: Detachment or resilience?," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(3), pages 361-383, September.
    19. Altincekic, Ceren & Bearce, David H., 2014. "Why there Should be No Political Foreign Aid Curse," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 18-32.
    20. Ahmed Fouad El Haddad, 2024. "Beyond regulatory capture: Policy entrepreneurs' strategies in regulatory policies under authoritarianism," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 41(6), pages 961-984, November.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:222455. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/zbwkide.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.