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A Note On Ntu Convexity And Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes

Author

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  • RUUD HENDRICKX

    (CentER and Department of Econometrics and OR, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands)

Abstract

For cooperative games with transferable utility, convexity has turned out to be an important and widely applicable concept, mainly because it implies some very nice and handy properties. One of these is that every extended marginal vector constitutes a population monotonic allocation scheme. In this note, this well-known result is generalised to games with nontransferable utility.

Suggested Citation

  • Ruud Hendrickx, 2003. "A Note On Ntu Convexity And Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(04), pages 385-390.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:05:y:2003:i:04:n:s0219198903001112
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198903001112
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ichiishi,Tatsuro, 1993. "The Cooperative Nature of the Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521414449.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Population monotonic allocation schemes; NTU games; convexity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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