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A Decision Framework for Managing Risk to Airports from Terrorist Attack

Author

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  • Abdollah Shafieezadeh
  • Eun J. Cha
  • Bruce R. Ellingwood

Abstract

This article presents an asset‐level security risk management framework to assist stakeholders of critical assets with allocating limited budgets for enhancing their safety and security against terrorist attack. The proposed framework models the security system of an asset, considers various threat scenarios, and models the sequential decision framework of attackers during the attack. Its novel contributions are the introduction of the notion of partial neutralization of attackers by defenders, estimation of total loss from successful, partially successful, and unsuccessful actions of attackers at various stages of an attack, and inclusion of the effects of these losses on the choices made by terrorists at various stages of the attack. The application of the proposed method is demonstrated in an example dealing with security risk management of a U.S. commercial airport, in which a set of plausible threat scenarios and risk mitigation options are considered. It is found that a combination of providing blast‐resistant cargo containers and a video surveillance system on the airport perimeter fence is the best option based on minimum expected life‐cycle cost considering a 10‐year service period.

Suggested Citation

  • Abdollah Shafieezadeh & Eun J. Cha & Bruce R. Ellingwood, 2015. "A Decision Framework for Managing Risk to Airports from Terrorist Attack," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 35(2), pages 292-306, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:riskan:v:35:y:2015:i:2:p:292-306
    DOI: 10.1111/risa.12266
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gabriel Kuper & Fabio Massacci & Woohyun Shim & Julian Williams, 2020. "Who Should Pay for Interdependent Risk? Policy Implications for Security Interdependence Among Airports," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(5), pages 1001-1019, May.
    2. Benjamin Donald Oakes & Lars‐Göran Mattsson & Per Näsman & Andrés Alayón Glazunov, 2018. "A Systems‐Based Risk Assessment Framework for Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) on Critical Infrastructures," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 38(6), pages 1279-1305, June.
    3. Ivano Bongiovanni & Cameron Newton, 2019. "Toward an Epidemiology of Safety and Security Risks: An Organizational Vulnerability Assessment in International Airports," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(6), pages 1281-1297, June.
    4. J. S. Busby & B. Green & D. Hutchison, 2017. "Analysis of Affordance, Time, and Adaptation in the Assessment of Industrial Control System Cybersecurity Risk," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(7), pages 1298-1314, July.
    5. Tsan‐Ming Choi & James H. Lambert, 2017. "Advances in Risk Analysis with Big Data," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(8), pages 1435-1442, August.
    6. Sai Ho Chung & Hoi Lam Ma & Hing Kai Chan, 2017. "Cascading Delay Risk of Airline Workforce Deployments with Crew Pairing and Schedule Optimization," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(8), pages 1443-1458, August.
    7. Hunt, Kyle & Agarwal, Puneet & Zhuang, Jun, 2022. "On the adoption of new technology to enhance counterterrorism measures: An attacker–defender game with risk preferences," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 218(PB).
    8. Hunt, Kyle & Agarwal, Puneet & Zhuang, Jun, 2021. "Technology adoption for airport security: Modeling public disclosure and secrecy in an attacker-defender game," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).

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