IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/reensy/v99y2012icp45-54.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A game theoretic framework for evaluation of the impacts of hackers diversity on security measures

Author

Listed:
  • Zare Moayedi, Behzad
  • Azgomi, Mohammad Abdollahi

Abstract

Game theoretical methods offer new insights into quantitative evaluation of dependability and security. Currently, there is a wide range of useful game theoretic approaches to model the behaviour of intelligent agents. However, it is necessary to revise these approaches if there is a community of hackers with significant diversity in their behaviours. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach to extend the basic ideas of applying game theory in stochastic modelling. The proposed method classifies the community of hackers based on two main criteria used widely in hacker classifications, which are motivation and skill. We use Markov chains to model the system and compute the transition rates between the states based on the preferences and the skill distributions of hacker classes. The resulting Markov chains can be solved to obtain the desired security measures. We also present the results of an illustrative example using the proposed approach, which examines the relation between the attributes of the community of hackers and the security measures.

Suggested Citation

  • Zare Moayedi, Behzad & Azgomi, Mohammad Abdollahi, 2012. "A game theoretic framework for evaluation of the impacts of hackers diversity on security measures," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 45-54.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reensy:v:99:y:2012:i:c:p:45-54
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2011.11.001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0951832011002389
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ress.2011.11.001?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hausken, Kjell, 2008. "Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 186(2), pages 856-881, April.
    2. Seth D. Guikema, 2009. "Game Theory Models of Intelligent Actors in Reliability Analysis: An Overview of the State of the Art," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Vicki M. M. Bier & M. Naceur Azaiez (ed.), Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats, chapter 2, pages 13-31, Springer.
    3. Azaiez, M.N. & Bier, Vicki M., 2007. "Optimal resource allocation for security in reliability systems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 181(2), pages 773-786, September.
    4. Jun Zhuang & Vicki M. Bier, 2007. "Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters---Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 55(5), pages 976-991, October.
    5. Hausken, Kjell, 2010. "Defense and attack of complex and dependent systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 29-42.
    6. Huseyin Cavusoglu & Srinivasan Raghunathan, 2004. "Configuration of Detection Software: A Comparison of Decision and Game Theory Approaches," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 1(3), pages 131-148, September.
    7. Kjell Hausken, 2002. "Probabilistic Risk Analysis and Game Theory," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 22(1), pages 17-27, February.
    8. Hausken, Kjell & Levitin, Gregory, 2009. "Minmax defense strategy for complex multi-state systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 577-587.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Umit Karabiyik & Tugba Karabiyik, 2020. "A Game Theoretic Approach for Digital Forensic Tool Selection †," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(5), pages 1-13, May.
    2. Wei Wang & Francesco Di Maio & Enrico Zio, 2019. "Adversarial Risk Analysis to Allocate Optimal Defense Resources for Protecting Cyber–Physical Systems from Cyber Attacks," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(12), pages 2766-2785, December.
    3. Chuanxi Cai & Shue Mei & Weijun Zhong, 2019. "Configuration of intrusion prevention systems based on a legal user: the case for using intrusion prevention systems instead of intrusion detection systems," Information Technology and Management, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 55-71, June.
    4. Gao, Xing & Zhong, Weijun & Mei, Shue, 2013. "A game-theory approach to configuration of detection software with decision errors," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 35-43.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ben Yaghlane, Asma & Azaiez, M. Naceur, 2017. "Systems under attack-survivability rather than reliability: Concept, results, and applications," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 258(3), pages 1156-1164.
    2. Zhang, Chi & Ramirez-Marquez, José Emmanuel & Wang, Jianhui, 2015. "Critical infrastructure protection using secrecy – A discrete simultaneous game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 242(1), pages 212-221.
    3. Qingqing Zhai & Rui Peng & Jun Zhuang, 2020. "Defender–Attacker Games with Asymmetric Player Utilities," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(2), pages 408-420, February.
    4. Hausken, Kjell, 2010. "Defense and attack of complex and dependent systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 29-42.
    5. Hausken, Kjell, 2008. "Strategic defense and attack for reliability systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 93(11), pages 1740-1750.
    6. Shan, Xiaojun & Zhuang, Jun, 2018. "Modeling cumulative defensive resource allocation against a strategic attacker in a multi-period multi-target sequential game," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 12-26.
    7. Kjell Hausken, 2014. "Individual versus overarching protection and attack of assets," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 22(1), pages 89-112, March.
    8. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2010. "Separation in homogeneous systems with independent identical elements," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 203(3), pages 625-634, June.
    9. Zhang, Jing & Zhuang, Jun & Jose, Victor Richmond R., 2018. "The role of risk preferences in a multi-target defender-attacker resource allocation game," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 95-104.
    10. Yan, Xihong & Ren, Xiaorong & Nie, Xiaofeng, 2022. "A budget allocation model for domestic airport network protection," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 82(PB).
    11. Asma Ben Yaghlane & Mohamed Naceur Azaiez, 2019. "System survivability to continuous attacks: A game theoretic setting for constant attack rate processes," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 70(8), pages 1308-1320, August.
    12. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2009. "Meeting a demand vs. enhancing protections in homogeneous parallel systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 94(11), pages 1711-1717.
    13. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2010. "Influence of attacker's target recognition ability on defense strategy in homogeneous parallel systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 95(5), pages 565-572.
    14. Bier, Vicki M. & Hausken, Kjell, 2013. "Defending and attacking a network of two arcs subject to traffic congestion," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 214-224.
    15. Hausken, Kjell, 2017. "Special versus general protection and attack of parallel and series components," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 239-256.
    16. Talarico, Luca & Reniers, Genserik & Sörensen, Kenneth & Springael, Johan, 2015. "MISTRAL: A game-theoretical model to allocate security measures in a multi-modal chemical transportation network with adaptive adversaries," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 105-114.
    17. Mo, Huadong & Xie, Min & Levitin, Gregory, 2015. "Optimal resource distribution between protection and redundancy considering the time and uncertainties of attacks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 243(1), pages 200-210.
    18. Chen, Shun & Zhao, Xudong & Chen, Zhilong & Hou, Benwei & Wu, Yipeng, 2022. "A game-theoretic method to optimize allocation of defensive resource to protect urban water treatment plants against physical attacks," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 36(C).
    19. Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Luo, Yi, 2014. "Incorporating risk seeking attitude into defense strategy," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 104-109.
    20. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2009. "Intelligence and impact contests in systems with redundancy, false targets, and partial protection," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 94(12), pages 1927-1941.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:reensy:v:99:y:2012:i:c:p:45-54. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/reliability-engineering-and-system-safety .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.