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Big audit firms as regulatory intermediaries in transnational labor governance

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  • Luc Fransen
  • Genevieve LeBaron

Abstract

Due diligence and corporate disclosure initiatives effectively expand the role of professional service firms as regulatory intermediaries in the governance of conditions of production in global supply chains. In this paper, we examine the rise of the “Big Four” audit firms in the market for services connected to transnational labor governance. Through a qualitative case study of audit firms in modern slavery governance, we argue that the Big Four's political repertoire for transnational labor governance expands beyond the roles that are typically linked to their services, and promotes an agenda that touches on key debates on what constitutes proper transnational labor governance. Big audit firms engage in a variety of informal and covert influencing practices and are shown to promote an agenda of incrementalist soft‐law labor governance, opposing concrete performance targets, binding public regulation and an independent watchdog role for civil society.

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  • Luc Fransen & Genevieve LeBaron, 2019. "Big audit firms as regulatory intermediaries in transnational labor governance," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(2), pages 260-279, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:13:y:2019:i:2:p:260-279
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12224
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ainsley Elbra & John Mikler & Hannah Murphy‐Gregory, 2023. "The Big Four and corporate tax governance: From global dis‐harmony to national regulatory incrementalism," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 14(1), pages 72-83, February.
    2. Stefan Renckens & Graeme Auld, 2022. "Time to certify: Explaining varying efficiency of private regulatory audits," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(2), pages 500-518, April.
    3. Sheila Killian & Philip O'Regan & Ruth Lynch & Martin Laheen & Dionysios Karavidas, 2022. "Regulating havens: The role of hard and soft governance of tax experts in conditions of secrecy and low regulation," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(3), pages 722-737, July.
    4. Onna M. van den Broek & Robyn Klingler‐Vidra, 2022. "The UN Sustainable Development Goals as a North Star: How an intermediary network makes, takes, and retrofits the meaning of the Sustainable Development Goals," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 1306-1324, October.

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