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Horizontal partial shareholding, dual purpose concern, and mixed duopoly competition

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  • Pin Zhou
  • Hong Hong

Abstract

This paper investigates the combined effect of horizontal partial shareholding and dual purpose concern on quantity competition. We identify the type of acquiring firm on production quantity, consumer surplus, and social welfare. The results show that the combined effect may accelerate competition or mitigate competition, which depends on the trade‐off between the competition‐softening effect of horizontal partial shareholding and competition‐intensifying effect of dual purpose concern. Whether the consumer and society benefit from the combined effect also depends on the magnitude of horizontal shareholding and socialresponsibility preference.

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  • Pin Zhou & Hong Hong, 2022. "Horizontal partial shareholding, dual purpose concern, and mixed duopoly competition," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(7), pages 3107-3115, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:43:y:2022:i:7:p:3107-3115
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.3584
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Leonardos, Stefanos & Petrakis, Emmanuel & Skartados, Panagiotis & Stamatopoulos, Giorgos, 2021. "Partial passive ownership holdings and licensing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    5. Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nana Wan, 2024. "Impacts of platform coupons and power structure on an e‐commerce supply chain," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 45(1), pages 283-299, January.

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