Cartelizing effects of horizontal shareholding interlocks
Some models of industries with horizontal shareholding interlocks are generalized. First, we consider industries where firms exhibit different technologies and more general market demand functions. The cartelizing effects of financial interlocks are examined using both the Lerner index and the Herfindahl-Hirshman index. Furthermore, the model is extended to consider multiproduct oligopolies. We find a compact expression for the Lerner index and study the cartelizing effects of such an industry. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Volume (Year): 22 (2001)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
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