IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/coacre/v4y1988i2p564-567.html

Discussion of “Implementable equilibria in accounting contexts: An exploratory studyâ€

Author

Listed:
  • RONALD A. DYE

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Ronald A. Dye, 1988. "Discussion of “Implementable equilibria in accounting contexts: An exploratory studyâ€," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 4(2), pages 564-567, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:4:y:1988:i:2:p:564-567
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1988.tb00684.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.1988.tb00684.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1911-3846.1988.tb00684.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Amin H. Amershi & Peter Cheng, 1988. "Implementable equilibria in accounting contexts: An exploratory study," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 4(2), pages 515-563, March.
    2. Demski, Joel S. & Sappington, David, 1984. "Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 152-171, June.
    3. Antle, R, 1982. "The Auditor As An Economic Agent," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(2), pages 503-527.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Amin H. Amershi & Peter Cheng, 1990. "Intrafirm resource allocation: The economics of transfer pricing and cost allocations in accounting," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(1), pages 61-99, September.
    2. Amin H. Amershi & Peter Cheng, 1988. "Implementable equilibria in accounting contexts: An exploratory study," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 4(2), pages 515-563, March.
    3. Amin H. Amershi & Peter Cheng, 1989. "On the demand for historical events recording and maintenance of audit trails," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(1), pages 72-90, September.
    4. Steven T. Schwartz & Richard A. Young & Kristina Zvinakis, 2000. "Reputation Without Repeated Interaction: A Role for Public Disclosures," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 351-375, December.
    5. Pau Olivella, 1995. "Information Structures and the Delegation of Monitoring," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 39, pages 1-32.
    6. Caillaud Bernard & Jullien Bruno, 1991. "Managerial incentives based on insider information," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9128, CEPREMAP.
    7. Romuald Élie & Emma Hubert & Thibaut Mastrolia & Dylan Possamaï, 2021. "Mean–field moral hazard for optimal energy demand response management," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 399-473, January.
    8. Signe ANTHON & Peter BOGETOFT & Bo Jellesmark THORSEN, 2007. "A Bureaucrat'S Procurement Strategy: Budget Constraints And Rationing," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 78(2), pages 221-244, June.
    9. Martin Besfamille, 2000. "Fiscal federalism, local public works and corruption," CREPP Working Papers 0001, Centre de Recherche en Economie Publique et de la Population (CREPP) (Research Center on Public and Population Economics) HEC-Management School, University of Liège.
    10. Bernarda Zamora & Pablo Amorós, 1998. "- Implementation Of Optimal Contracts Under Adverse Selection," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-25, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    11. Tangeras, Thomas P., 2002. "Collusion-proof yardstick competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 231-254, February.
    12. Renee Courtois Haltom & Bruno Sultanum, 2018. "Preventing Bank Runs," Richmond Fed Economic Brief, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue March.
    13. Goodwin, Jenny, 2002. "Understanding Auditor-Client Relationships: A Multi-Faceted Analysis (Rutgers Series in Accounting Research); Gary Kleinman and Dan Palmon; Markus Wiener Publishers, Princeton, NJ, hardcover, 2001, pp," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 429-432, June.
    14. Michael Krapp, 2000. "Relative Leistungsbewertung im dynamischen Kontext — Eine Analyse der Kollusionsproblematik bei wiederholter Delegation," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 257-277, May.
    15. Nahum D. Melumad, 1989. "Asymmetric information and the termination of contracts in agencies," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(2), pages 733-753, March.
    16. Johnson, Marilyn F. & Nelson, Karen K. & Frankel, Richard M., 2002. "The Relation Between Auditor's Fees for Non-audit Services and Earnings Quality," Research Papers 1696r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    17. von Siemens, Ferdinand A. & Kosfeld, Michael, 2014. "Team production in competitive labor markets with adverse selection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 181-198.
    18. Jeff Everett & Constance Friesen & Dean Neu & Abu Shiraz Rahaman, 2018. "We Have Never Been Secular: Religious Identities, Duties, and Ethics in Audit Practice," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 153(4), pages 1121-1142, December.
    19. Simona Grassi & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2016. "Information acquisition, referral, and organization," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(4), pages 935-960, November.
    20. De Marco Giuseppe & Immordino Giovanni, 2014. "Reciprocity in the Principal–Multiple Agent Model," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 445-482, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:4:y:1988:i:2:p:564-567. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1911-3846 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.