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Current cost disclosers and nondisclosers: Theory and Canadian evidence

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  • DANIEL B. THORNTON

Abstract

. According to section 4510 of the CICA Handbook “supplementary information about the effects of changing prices should be disclosed …†by certain corporations. Three hundred and eighty firms met the Handbook criteria in 1983, but only 73 complied, even partially. This study describes the disclosers and nondisclosers, with the objective of understanding why the CICA recommendation received such a cool reception. The findings support the hypothesis that Canadian firms disclosed nonhistone cost accounting data on the basis of cost/benefit considerations, and that auditors played a role in influencing the disclosures. There was virtually no disclosure of current cost information by clients of other than the Big Eight auditing firms. Utilities, subject to different political pressures than other firms, were apparently relatively more strongly influenced by the materiality of the disclosures. Among the nondisclosers, firms that were a little larger than average, were SEC registrants, and apparently would have shown the most material current cost adjustments if they had disclosed, tended to give reasons for not disclosing. Their publicly stated reasons implied that the costs of disclosing exceeded the benefits to them, or that they believed that the information was not useful to financial statement readers. In contrast to the United States, where compliance with similar disclosures described in FASB 33 is legally enforced by the SEC, Canada provides a laboratory for examining the relatively free choice of whether to disclose or not. Whether revamping section 4510 would increase its acceptability is left as an issue for further research to resolve. Résumé. Selon le chapitre 4510 du Manuel de l'I.C.C.A., certaines sociétés “doivent présenter un supplément d'informations sur les effets des variations de prix†. Alors que trois cent quatre†vingts firmes satisfaisaient aux exigences du Manuel en 1983, seulement soixante treize d'entre elles se sontpliées aux exigences de divulgation, et ce partiellement. Cette étude décrit les sociétés “divulgatrices†et “non†divulgatrices†, et vise à comprendre le faible enthousiasme pour les recommandations de l'I.C.C.A. Les résultats appuient l'hypothèse que les sociétés canadiennes ayant présenté des informations sur la base de la comptabilité aux coûts actuels l'ont fait par suite d'analyses coûts/avantages, de même que l'influence des vérificateurs sur ce type de divulgation. Il n'y a presque pas eu de présentation d'informations aux coûts actuels de la part des sociétés vérifiées par des cabinets autres que les constituantes des “Big Eight†. Les entreprises de services publics, sur lesquelles s'exercent des pressions politiques d'une nature différente de celles des autres sociétés, ont été relativement plus influencées par l'importance relative de cette divulgation. Parmi les sociétés “non†divulgatrices†, celles de taille quelque peu supérieure à la moyenne, inscrites à la SEC, et qui apparemment auraient montré les ajustements de coûts actuels les plus importants en vertu du mode de présentation suggéré, avaient tendance à justifier la non†divulgation de tels renseignements. L'analyse avantages/coûts défavorable, ou l'utilité discutable de telles informations pour les lecteurs d‘états financiers, constituaient les raisons invoquées par ces sociétés à l'appui de la non†divulgation. Contrairement aux Etats†Unis, où l'adhésion aux recommandations du FASB 33 portant sur une information de nature similaire est exigée par la SEC, le Canada fournit un laboratoire où il est possible d'examiner un libre†choix relatif de divulgation ou de non†divulgation. En vertu des résultats de cette étude, l'utilité des informations présentées selon le chapitre 4510 peut être mise en doute. La modification en profondeur du chapitre 4510 comme élément de solution à la non†adhésion s'avère une question sur laquelle les recherches ultérieures devront se pencher.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel B. Thornton, 1986. "Current cost disclosers and nondisclosers: Theory and Canadian evidence," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 3(1), pages 1-34, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:3:y:1986:i:1:p:1-34
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1986.tb00623.x
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    1. Stephen L. Buzby, 1986. "Discussion of “Current cost disclosers and nondisclosers: Theory and Canadian evidenceâ€," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 3(1), pages 45-49, September.
    2. Thomas W. Scott, 1991. "Pension disclosures under SFAS No. 87: Theory and evidence," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(1), pages 62-81, September.
    3. Rã‰Al Labelle, 1990. "Bond covenants and changes in accounting policy: Canadian evidence," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(2), pages 677-698, March.
    4. Cullinan, Charles P., 1999. "International Trade and Accounting Policy Choice: Theory and Canadian Evidence," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 597-607, 010.
    5. Daniel B. Thornton, 1988. "Capital values in use versus replacement costs: Theory and Canadian evidence," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(1), pages 343-370, September.
    6. Susan Bartlett & Michael John Jones, 1997. "Annual reporting disclosures 1970-90: an exemplification," Accounting History Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(1), pages 61-80.
    7. I. Krinsky & W. Rotenberg, 1989. "The valuation of initial public offerings," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(2), pages 501-515, March.
    8. Rã‰Al Labelle, 1990. "Clauses restrictives et modifications comptables: une étude canadienne," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(2), pages 699-723, March.
    9. Raphael Amit & Joshua Livnat & Paul Zarowin, 1989. "A classification of mergers and acquisitions by motives: Analysis of market responses," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(1), pages 143-158, September.

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